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Abstract
We present an approach where probabilistic logic is combined with default reasoning from condi-
tional knowledge bases in Kraus et al.’s System P , Pearl’s System Z, and Lehmann’s lexicographic
entailment. The resulting probabilistic generalizations of default reasoning from conditional knowl-
edge bases allow for handling in a uniform framework strict logical knowledge, default logical
knowledge, as well as purely probabilistic knowledge. Interestingly, probabilistic entailment in Sys-
tem P coincides with probabilistic entailment under g-coherence from imprecise probability assess-
ments. We then analyze the semantic and nonmonotonic properties of the new formalisms. It turns
out that they all are proper generalizations of their classical counterparts and have similar properties
as them. In particular, they all satisfy the rationality postulates of System P and some Conditioning
property. Moreover, probabilistic entailment in System Z and probabilistic lexicographic entailment
both satisfy the property of Rational Monotonicity and some Irrelevance property, while probabilis-
tic entailment in System P does not. We also analyze the relationships between the new formalisms.
Here, probabilistic entailment in System P is weaker than probabilistic entailment in System Z,
which in turn is weaker than probabilistic lexicographic entailment. Moreover, they all are weaker
than entailment in probabilistic logic where default sentences are interpreted as strict sentences.
Under natural conditions, probabilistic entailment in System Z and lexicographic entailment even
coincide with such entailment in probabilistic logic, while probabilistic entailment in System P does
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120 T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 168 (2005) 119–161not. Finally, we also present algorithms for reasoning under probabilistic entailment in System Z and
probabilistic lexicographic entailment, and we give a precise picture of its complexity.
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1. Introduction
During the recent decades, reasoning about probabilities has started to play an important
role in AI. In particular, reasoning about interval restrictions for conditional probabilities,
also called conditional constraints [49], has been a subject of extensive research efforts.
Roughly, a conditional constraint is of the form (ψ |φ)[l, u], where ψ and φ are events, and
[l, u] is a subinterval of the unit interval [0,1]. It encodes that the conditional probability
of ψ given φ lies in [l, u].
An important approach for handling conditional constraints is probabilistic logic, which
has its origin in philosophy and logic, and whose roots can be traced back to already
Boole in 1854 [12]. There is a wide spectrum of formal languages that have been explored
in probabilistic logic, ranging from constraints for unconditional and conditional events
to rich languages that specify linear inequalities over events (see especially the work by
Nilsson [54,55], Fagin et al. [19], Dubois and Prade et al. [2,13,16,17], Frisch and Had-
dawy [21], and the author [48,49,51]; see also the survey on sentential probability logic by
Hailperin [35]). The main decision and optimization problems in probabilistic logic are de-
ciding satisfiability, deciding logical consequence, and computing tight logically entailed
intervals. Recently, column generation techniques from operations research have been suc-
cessfully used to solve large problem instances in probabilistic logic (see especially the
work by Jaumard et al. [37] and Hansen et al. [36]).
Example 1.1 (Eagles). A simple collection of conditional constraints KB may encode the
strict logical knowledge “all eagles are birds” and “all birds have feathers” as well as
the purely probabilistic knowledge “birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95” (cf. Ex-
ample 2.1). This collection of conditional constraints KB is satisfiable, and some logical
consequences in probabilistic logic from KB are “all birds have feathers”, “birds fly with a
probability of at least 0.95”, “all eagles have feathers”, and “eagles fly with a probability
between 0 and 1”; in fact, these are the tightest intervals that follow from KB (cf. Exam-
ple 2.2). That is, we especially cannot conclude anything from KB about the ability to fly
of eagles.
A closely related research area is default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases,
which consist of a collection of strict statements in classical logic and a collection of defea-
sible rules, also called defaults. The former must always hold, while the latter are rules of
the kind ψ ← φ, which read as “generally, if φ then ψ”. Such rules may have exceptions,
which can be handled in different ways.
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knowledge bases and extensive work on its desired properties. The core of these proper-
ties are the rationality postulates of System P by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [40],
which constitute a sound and complete axiom system for several classical model-theoretic
entailment relations under uncertainty measures on worlds. They characterize classical
model-theoretic entailment under preferential structures [40,64], infinitesimal probabili-
ties [1,57], possibility measures [14], and world rankings [33,65]. As shown by Friedman
and Halpern [20], many of these uncertainty measures on worlds are expressible as plausi-
bility measures. The postulates of System P also characterize an entailment relation based
on conditional objects [15]. A survey of the above relationships is given in [6,22].
Mainly to solve problems with irrelevant information, the notion of rational closure as
a more adventurous notion of entailment was introduced by Lehmann [45,47]. It is equiva-
lent to entailment in System Z by Pearl [58], to the least specific possibility entailment by
Benferhat et al. [5], and to a conditional (modal) logic-based entailment by Lamarre [44].
Finally, mainly to solve problems with property inheritance from classes to exceptional
subclasses, the maximum entropy approach to default entailment was proposed by Gold-
szmidt et al. [31]; lexicographic entailment was introduced by Lehmann [46] and Benferhat
et al. [4]; conditional entailment was proposed by Geffner [24,26]; and an infinitesimal be-
lief function approach was suggested by Benferhat et al. [7]. The following example due to
Goldszmidt and Pearl [34] illustrates default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases.
Example 1.2 (Penguins). A conditional knowledge base KB may encode the strict logical
knowledge “all penguins are birds” and the default logical knowledge “generally, birds fly”,
“generally, penguins do not fly”, and “generally, birds have wings”. Some desirable con-
clusions from KB [34] are “generally, birds fly” and “generally, birds have wings” (which
both belong to KB), “generally, penguins have wings” (since the set of all penguins is a
subclass of the set of all birds, and thus penguins should inherit all properties of birds),
“generally, penguins do not fly” (since properties of more specific classes should override
inherited properties of less specific classes), and “generally, red birds fly” (since “red” is
not mentioned at all in KB and thus should be considered irrelevant to the ability to fly of
birds).
There are several works in the literature on probabilistic foundations for default reason-
ing from conditional knowledge bases [1,11,31,57], on combinations of Reiter’s default
logic [63] with statistical inference [43,67], and on a rich first-order formalism for deriv-
ing degrees of belief from statistical knowledge including default statements [3]. However,
there has been no work so far that extends probabilistic logic by the capability of handling
defaults as in conditional knowledge bases.
In this paper, we try to fill this gap. We present extensions of probabilistic logic by
defaults as in conditional knowledge bases under Kraus et al.’s System P [40], Pearl’s
System Z [58], and Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment [46]. The new formalisms allow
for expressing in a uniform framework strict logical knowledge and purely probabilistic
knowledge from probabilistic logic, as well as default logical knowledge from default rea-
soning from conditional knowledge bases. Informally, strict logical knowledge represents
sentences that must always hold, while purely probabilistic (resp., default logical) knowl-
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(resp., qualitative) way.
Example 1.3 (Ostriches). Consider the strict logical knowledge “all ostriches are birds”,
the default logical knowledge “generally, birds have legs” and “generally, birds fly”, and
the purely probabilistic knowledge “ostriches fly with a probability of at most 0.05”. Ob-
viously, some desired conclusions are “generally, birds have legs”, “generally, birds fly”,
and “ostriches fly with a probability of at most 0.05”, since these sentences are explicitly
stated above. Two other desired conclusions are “generally, ostriches have legs” (since the
property of having legs of birds should be inherited down to the subclass of all ostriches)
and “generally, red birds fly” (since the property of being red is not mentioned above, and
thus it should be irrelevant to the ability to fly). But neither probabilistic logic nor default
reasoning from conditional knowledge bases can produce all these desired conclusions,
since the former cannot handle default logical knowledge, while the latter cannot deal with
purely probabilistic knowledge. However, in the new formalisms of this paper, we can deal
with all the above sentences. In particular, the probabilistic generalization of lexicographic
entailment also produces all the above desired conclusions.
A companion paper [52] presents similar probabilistic generalizations of default rea-
soning from conditional knowledge bases. The formalisms in [52], however, are quite
different from the ones in this paper, since they allow for handling default purely prob-
abilistic knowledge rather than (strict) purely probabilistic knowledge in addition to strict
logical knowledge and default logical knowledge. For example, the formalisms in [52] al-
low for expressing sentences of the form “generally, birds (and special birds) fly with a
probability of at least 0.95” rather than “birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95”. In-
tuitively, the former means that being able to fly with a probability of at least 0.95 should
apply to the class of all birds and all subclasses of birds, as long as this is consistent, while
the latter says that being able to fly with a probability of at least 0.95 should only apply to
the class of all birds. For this reason, the formalisms in [52] are generally much stronger
than the ones here (cf. Section 8.1). Hence, they can be considered as strong nonmonotonic
probabilistic logics, while the formalisms here are weak nonmonotonic probabilistic logics.
Interestingly, probabilistic reasoning in the probabilistic generalization of Kraus et al.’s
System P in the present paper coincides with probabilistic reasoning under g-coherence
from imprecise probability assessments in statistics (cf. Section 8.2).
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We present combinations of probabilistic reasoning in probabilistic logic with default
reasoning from conditional knowledge bases under Kraus et al.’s System P [40],
Pearl’s System Z [58], and Lehmann’s lexicographic approach [46]. The resulting
probabilistic formalisms, also called weak nonmonotonic probabilistic logics, allow
for handling in a uniform framework strict logical knowledge and purely probabilistic
knowledge from probabilistic logic, as well as default logical knowledge from condi-
tional knowledge bases.
• We explore the nonmonotonic properties of the three weak nonmonotonic probabilis-
tic logics. In particular, they all three satisfy the rationality postulates of System P
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tem Z and probabilistic lexicographic entailment both satisfy the property of Rational
Monotonicity and have some Irrelevance property, while probabilistic entailment in
System P is lacking these two properties.
• We analyze the relationships between the three weak nonmonotonic probabilistic log-
ics. It turns out that probabilistic entailment in System P is weaker than probabilistic
entailment in System Z, which in turn is weaker than probabilistic lexicographic en-
tailment. Furthermore, we show that all three formalisms are weaker than entailment in
probabilistic logic from knowledge bases in which all the default sentences are simply
interpreted as strict sentences.
• We show that probabilistic entailment in System Z and probabilistic lexicographic en-
tailment coincide with entailment in probabilistic logic, whenever it is consistent to
interpret all relevant default sentences as strict sentences, while probabilistic entail-
ment in System P does not have this property. Furthermore, probabilistic entailment
in Systems P and Z as well as probabilistic lexicographic entailment are proper gen-
eralizations of their classical counterparts.
• Finally, we present algorithms for computing tight intervals under probabilistic en-
tailment in System Z and probabilistic lexicographic entailment, which are based on
reductions to the standard tasks of deciding model existence and computing tight in-
tervals under entailment in probabilistic logic. Furthermore, we draw a precise picture
of the complexity of deciding logical consequence and of computing tight intervals
under probabilistic entailment in System Z and probabilistic lexicographic entailment
in general as well as restricted cases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the main concepts from
probabilistic logic, while Section 3 recalls entailment in Systems P and Z as well as lexico-
graphic entailment from default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases. In Section 4,
we introduce the novel probabilistic generalizations of entailment in System P , entailment
in System Z, and lexicographic entailment. Section 5 explores the nonmonotonic prop-
erties of these new probabilistic formalisms, their relationships, and the relationships to
their classical counterparts. In Sections 6 and 7, we provide algorithms for probabilistic
reasoning under the new probabilistic formalisms, and we also analyze its computational
complexity, respectively. Section 8 provides a comparison to related work. In Section 9,
we finally summarize the main results and give an outlook on future research.
In order to not distract from the flow of reading, some technical details and proofs have
been moved to Appendices A–E.
2. Probabilistic logic
In this section, we recall the main concepts from probabilistic logic (see especially the
work by Nilsson [54,55], Fagin et al. [19], Dubois and Prade et al. [2,13,16,17], Frisch and
Haddawy [21], and the author [48,49,51]). We define a propositional language of logical
constraints and of Boolean combinations of conditional constraints, which are interpreted
in probability distributions over a set of worlds. We also define probabilistic knowledge
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bilistic knowledge bases.
2.1. Syntax
We first formally define the syntax of logical constraints and Boolean combinations of
conditional constraints as well as probabilistic knowledge bases.
We assume a set of basic events Φ = {p1, . . . , pl} with l  1. We use ⊥ and  to de-
note false and true, respectively. We define events by induction as follows. Every element
of Φ ∪ {⊥,} is an event. If φ and ψ are events, then also ¬φ and (φ ∧ ψ). A condi-
tional event is of the form ψ |φ with events ψ and φ. A conditional constraint is of the
form (ψ |φ)[l, u] with a conditional event ψ |φ and real numbers l, u ∈ [0,1]. We define
probabilistic formulas by induction as follows. Every conditional constraint is a proba-
bilistic formula. If F and G are probabilistic formulas, then also ¬F and (F ∧ G). Note
that probabilistic formulas will especially be used for defining concepts around probability
rankings (cf. Section 4.1). We use (F ∨G) and (F ⇐ G) to abbreviate ¬(¬F ∧ ¬G) and
¬(¬F ∧G), respectively, where F and G are either two events or two probabilistic formu-
las, and we adopt the usual conventions to eliminate parentheses. A logical constraint is an
event of the form ψ ⇐ φ. A probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) consists of a finite
set of logical constraints L and a finite set of conditional constraints P such that (i) l  u
for all (ε)[l, u] ∈ P , and (ii) ε1 	= ε2 for any two distinct (ε1)[l1, u1], (ε2)[l2, u2] ∈ P .
Example 2.1 (Eagles cont’d). The strict logical knowledge “all eagles are birds” and “all
birds have feathers”, and the purely probabilistic knowledge “birds fly with a probability
of at least 0.95” can be expressed by the probabilistic knowledge base KB = ({bird ⇐
eagle, feathers ⇐ bird}, {(fly | bird)[0.95,1]}).
2.2. Semantics
We next define the semantics of logical constraints and probabilistic formulas. To this
end, we first define the semantics of events in worlds, which are truth assignments to the
basic events. We then define the semantics of logical constraints and probabilistic formulas
in probability distributions over such worlds. We also define the model-theoretic notions
of satisfiability and logical entailment for this language and for probabilistic knowledge
bases. We finally recall the relationship to model-theoretic logical entailment in ordinary
propositional logic.
A world I associates with every basic event in Φ a binary truth value. We extend I by
induction to all events as usual. We denote by IΦ the set of all worlds for Φ . A world I
satisfies an event φ, or I is a model of φ, denoted I |= φ, iff I (φ) = true. We say I satisfies
a set of events L, or I is a model of L, denoted I |= L, iff I is a model of all φ ∈ L. An
event φ (resp., a set of events L) is satisfiable iff a model of φ (resp., L) exists. An event ψ
is a logical consequence of φ (resp., L), denoted φ |= ψ (resp., L |= ψ ), iff each model
of φ (resp., L) is also a model of ψ . We use φ 	|=ψ (resp., L 	|=ψ ) to denote that φ |= ψ
(resp., L |= ψ ) does not hold.
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Pr : IΦ → [0,1] such that all Pr(I ) with I ∈ IΦ sum up to 1). The probability of an
event φ in Pr, denoted Pr(φ), is the sum of all Pr(I ) such that I ∈ IΦ and I |= φ. For
events φ and ψ with Pr(φ) > 0, we write Pr(ψ |φ) to abbreviate Pr(ψ ∧ φ)/Pr(φ), and
we define the conditioning of Pr on φ, denoted Prφ , by Prφ(I ) = Pr(I ) /Pr(φ) for all
I ∈ IΦ with I |= φ, and by Prφ(I ) = 0 for all other I ∈ IΦ . The truth of logical constraints
and probabilistic formulas F in Pr, denoted Pr |= F , is inductively defined by (i) Pr |=
ψ ⇐ φ iff Pr(ψ ∧ φ) = Pr(φ), (ii) Pr |= (ψ |φ)[l, u] iff Pr(φ) = 0 or Pr(ψ |φ) ∈ [l, u],
(iii) Pr |= ¬F iff not Pr |= F , and (iv) Pr |= (F ∧ G) iff Pr |= F and Pr |= G. Observe
here that Pr |= ψ ⇐ φ iff Pr |= (ψ |φ)[1,1]. We say Pr satisfies a logical constraint or
probabilistic formula F , or Pr is a model of F , iff Pr |= F . We say Pr satisfies a set of
logical constraints and probabilistic formulas F , or Pr is a model of F , denoted Pr |= F ,
iff Pr is a model of all F ∈ F . We say F is satisfiable iff a model of F exists. A logical
constraint or probabilistic formula F is a logical consequence of F , denoted F ||=F , iff
every model of F is also a model of F . A probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P )
is satisfiable iff L ∪ P is satisfiable. The notion of logical entailment for probabilistic
knowledge bases KB = (L,P ) is defined as follows. A logical or conditional constraint F
is a logical consequence of KB, denoted KB ||=F , iff L∪P ||=F . A conditional constraint
(ψ |φ)[l, u] is a tight logical consequence of KB, denoted KB ||=tight (ψ |φ)[l, u], iff l (resp.,
u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ |φ) subject to all models Pr of L ∪ P with
Pr(φ) > 0. Note that here we define [l, u] as the empty interval, denoted [1,0], when
L∪ P ||=⊥ ⇐ φ.
The following example illustrates the above notions of satisfiability, logical conse-
quence, and tight logical consequence. Note that deciding satisfiability and logical con-
sequence can be reduced to deciding the solvability of a system of linear constraints, while
computing the interval of a tight logical consequence is reducible to solving two linear
optimization problems; cf. especially [19,39,51].
Example 2.2 (Eagles cont’d). Consider the probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P )
from Example 2.1. Then, it is easy to verify that the probabilistic interpretations Pr1, Pr2,
and Pr3 shown in Table 1 are models of KB. Hence, KB is satisfiable. Furthermore, some
logical consequences of KB are given as follows:
KB ||= (feathers | bird)[1,1], KB ||= (fly | bird)[0.95,1],
KB ||= (feathers | eagle)[1,1], KB ||= (fly | eagle)[0,1].
Informally, “all birds have feathers”, “birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95”, “all
eagles have feathers”, and “eagles fly with a probability between 0 and 1”. In fact, these
are the tightest intervals that are logically entailed by KB, since Pr1(feathers | bird) = 1,
Pr1(fly | bird) = 1, Pr1(feathers | eagle) = 1, Pr1(fly | eagle) = 1, Pr2(fly | bird) = 0.95,
and Pr3(fly | eagle) = 0. Finally, observe that the strict logical property of having feathers
is inherited from birds down to its subclass eagles, whereas the probabilistic property of
being able to fly with a probability of at least 0.95 is not inherited from birds down to
eagles.
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Some probabilistic interpretations Pr1, Pr2, and Pr3
eagle bird feathers fly Pr1 Pr2 Pr3
I1 true true true true 1 0.95 0
I2 true true true false 0 0.05 0.05
I3 true true false true 0 0 0
I4 true true false false 0 0 0
I5 true false true true 0 0 0
I6 true false true false 0 0 0
I7 true false false true 0 0 0
I8 true false false false 0 0 0
I9 false true true true 0 0 0.95
I10 false true true false 0 0 0
I11 false true false true 0 0 0
I12 false true false false 0 0 0
I13 false false true true 0 0 0
I14 false false true false 0 0 0
I15 false false false true 0 0 0
I16 false false false false 0 0 0
Intuitively, the above notion of logical entailment of (ψ |φ)[l, u] from a probabilistic
knowledge base KB = (L,P ) is based on the idea of performing a conditioning of every
probability distribution Pr that satisfies L ∪ P on the premise φ. This result is more for-
mally expressed by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3. Let KB = (L,P ) be a probabilistic knowledge base, and (ψ |φ)[l, u] be
a conditional constraint. Then, (a) KB ||= (ψ |φ)[l, u] iff Prφ(ψ) ∈ [l, u] for all models
Pr of L ∪ P with Pr(φ)>0; and (b) KB ||=tight (ψ |φ)[l, u] iff l = inf Prφ(ψ) (resp., u =
sup Prφ(ψ)) subject to all models Pr of L∪ P with Pr(φ) > 0.
The following result shows that in probabilistic logic, a logical constraint ψ ⇐ φ has
the same meaning as the conditional constraint (ψ |φ)[1,1].
Theorem 2.4. Let KB = (L,P ) be a probabilistic knowledge base, and (ψ |φ)[1,1] be
a conditional constraint. Then, (a) KB ||= (ψ |φ)[1,1] iff KB ||=ψ ⇐ φ; and (b) (L,P ∪
{(ψ |φ)[1,1]}) has the same set of models as (L∪ {ψ ⇐ φ},P ).
The next result says that model-theoretic logical entailment in probabilistic logic gen-
eralizes model-theoretic logical entailment in ordinary propositional logic.
Theorem 2.5. Let KB = (L,P ) be a probabilistic knowledge base with P = ∅, and let
ψ ⇐ φ be a logical constraint. Then, KB ||=ψ ⇐ φ iff L |= ψ ⇐ φ.
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In this section, we recall the following formalisms for default reasoning from condi-
tional knowledge bases: Kraus et al.’s entailment in System P [40] (which is equivalent
to several other formalisms; cf. Section 1), Pearl’s entailment in System Z [34,58] (which
is equivalent to Lehmann’s rational closure [45,47], to the least specific possibility en-
tailment by Benferhat et al. [5], and to a conditional (modal) logic-based entailment by
Lamarre [44]), and Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment [46] (a special case of Benferhat
et al.’s lexicographic entailment [4]).
These formalisms for default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases all have in
common that they can be defined in terms of world rankings (which are certain mappings
from the set of all worlds to {0,1, . . .} ∪ {∞}), where entailment in System P can be
expressed by a set of world rankings, while entailment in System Z and lexicographic
entailment each have an associated unique world ranking.
Both Pearl’s entailment in System Z and Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment are more
sophisticated than entailment in System P and show a nicer semantic behavior than the lat-
ter. The following example illustrates this aspect. Here, we use p-entailment, z-entailment,
and lex-entailment to denote entailment in System P , entailment in System Z, and lexico-
graphic entailment, respectively.
Example 3.1 (Penguins cont’d). Consider again the collection of strict and default logical
sentences KB given in Example 1.2. Some default conclusions of KB under z- and lex-
entailment compared to p-entailment are shown in Table 2. Differently from p-entailment,
both z- and lex-entailment ignore irrelevant information. Furthermore, lex-entailment
shows a correct property inheritance from birds to penguins, while p-entailment does not
show any property inheritance at all, and z-entailment does not inherit the property of hav-
ing wings from the class of all birds to the exceptional subclass of all penguins (and thus
shows the problem of inheritance blocking). Finally, the default ¬fly ← penguin is entailed
by KB under all three notions of default entailment.
3.1. Preliminaries
We now formally define conditional knowledge bases as well as world and default rank-
ings along with their admissibility with conditional knowledge bases.
Informally, a conditional knowledge base consists of a set of strict statements in classical
logic and a set of defeasible rules (or defaults) of the form “ψ ← φ”, which informally
read as “generally, if φ then ψ”. Such rules may have exceptions, which can be handled in
Table 2
Some defaults entailed by KB under different semantics
fly ← red ∧ bird wings ← penguin ¬fly ← penguin
p-entailment − − +
z-entailment + − +
lex-entailment + + +
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φ and ψ are events. A conditional knowledge base KB = (L,D) consists of a finite set
of logical constraints L and a finite set of defaults D. The following example illustrates
conditional knowledge bases.
Example 3.2 (Penguins cont’d). The strict logical knowledge “all penguins are birds” and
the default logical knowledge “generally, birds fly”, “generally, penguins do not fly”, and
“generally, birds have wings” is encoded by the conditional knowledge base KB=({bird ⇐
penguin}, {fly ← bird,¬fly ← penguin,wings ← bird}).
A world I satisfies a default ψ ← φ, or I is a model of ψ ← φ, denoted I |= ψ ← φ,
iff I |= ψ ⇐ φ. We say I verifies ψ ← φ iff I |= φ ∧ ψ . We say I falsifies ψ ← φ iff
I |= φ∧¬ψ (that is, I 	|= ψ ← φ). We say I satisfies a set of events and defaults K , or I is
a model of K , denoted I |= K , iff I satisfies every member of K . We say K is satisfiable iff
a model of K exists. An event φ (resp., a default d) is a logical consequence of K , denoted
K |= φ (resp., K |= d), iff every model of K is also a model of φ (resp., d). An event φ
(resp., a default d) is a logical consequence of a conditional knowledge base KB = (L,D),
denoted KB |= φ (resp., KB |= d), iff L ∪ D |= φ (resp., L ∪ D |= d). A set of defaults
D tolerates a default d under a set of logical constraints L iff D ∪ L has a model that
verifies d . A set of defaults D is under L in conflict with a default ψ ← φ iff all models of
D ∪L∪ {φ} satisfy ¬ψ .
A world ranking κ is a mapping κ : IΦ → {0,1, . . .} ∪ {∞} such that κ(I ) = 0 for at
least one world I . It is extended to all events φ as follows. If φ is satisfiable, then κ(φ) =
min{κ(I ) | I ∈ IΦ, I |= φ}; otherwise, κ(φ) = ∞. A world ranking κ is admissible with
a conditional knowledge base KB = (L,D) iff κ(¬φ) = ∞ for all φ ∈ L, and κ(φ) < ∞
and κ(φ ∧ψ) < κ(φ ∧¬ψ) for all defaults ψ ← φ ∈ D.
Example 3.3 (Penguins cont’d). Table 3 shows the world rankings κ1, κ2, and κ3. It is
easy to verify that κ1 and κ2 are admissible with KB from Example 3.2. Note that κ1
and κ2 are the unique world rankings associated with KB in System Z and under lexico-
graphic entailment, respectively (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4). But κ3 is not admissible with
KB, since L contains the logical constraint bird ⇐ penguin, but κ3(penguin ∧ ¬bird) =
min(κ3(I5), κ3(I6), κ3(I7), κ3(I8)) = 4 	= ∞. Moreover, D contains the default wings ←
bird, but κ3(bird ∧ wings) = 0 = κ3(bird ∧¬wings).
A default ranking σ on a conditional knowledge base KB = (L,D) maps each d ∈ D to
a nonnegative integer. It is admissible with KB iff each D′ ⊆ D that is under L in conflict
with some d ∈ D contains a default d ′ such that σ(d ′) < σ(d).
Example 3.4 (Penguins cont’d). A default ranking σ on KB from Example 3.2 is given
by σ(fly ← bird) = σ(wings ← bird) = 0 and σ(¬fly ← penguin) = 1. It is not difficult to
verify that σ is admissible with KB. Note that σ is in fact the default ranking associated
with KB in System Z (see Section 3.3).
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Some world rankings κ1, κ2, and κ3
penguin bird wings fly κ1 κ2 κ3
I1 true true true true 2 3 2
I2 true true true false 1 1 1
I3 true true false true 2 4 0
I4 true true false false 1 2 2
I5 true false true true ∞ ∞ ∞
I6 true false true false ∞ ∞ 4
I7 true false false true ∞ ∞ ∞
I8 true false false false ∞ ∞ ∞
I9 false true true true 0 0 0
I10 false true true false 1 1 1
I11 false true false true 1 1 1
I12 false true false false 1 2 2
I13 false false true true 0 0 0
I14 false false true false 0 0 0
I15 false false false true 0 0 0
I16 false false false false 0 0 0
3.2. Consistency and entailment in System P
We now describe the notions of consistency and entailment in Kraus et al.’s System P
[40], which we call p-consistency and p-entailment, respectively. We define them in terms
of world rankings (see especially [24,25] for the equivalence between entailment in System
P and entailment under world rankings), and we then recall some important equivalent
characterizations of them.
A conditional knowledge base KB is p-consistent iff there exists a world ranking κ on
KB that is admissible with KB. It is p-inconsistent iff no such κ exists. A p-consistent
conditional knowledge base KB p-entails a default ψ ← φ iff either κ(φ) = ∞ or κ(φ ∧
ψ) < κ(φ ∧¬ψ) for all world rankings κ admissible with KB.
The following result due to Geffner [24] shows that the notion of p-consistency is equiv-
alent to the existence of admissible default rankings.
Theorem 3.5 (Geffner [24]). A conditional knowledge base KB is p-consistent iff there
exists a default ranking on KB that is admissible with KB.
The next characterization of p-consistency is due to Goldszmidt and Pearl [32].
Theorem 3.6 (Goldszmidt and Pearl [32]). A conditional knowledge base KB = (L,D) is
p-consistent iff an ordered partition (D0, . . . ,Dk) of D exists such that either (a) or (b)
holds:
(a) Every Di , 0 i  k, is the set of all d ∈⋃kj=i Dj tolerated under L by ⋃kj=i Dj .
(b) For every i, 0 i  k, each d ∈ Di is tolerated under L by ⋃kj=i Dj .
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p-entailment to p-consistency. This result is essentially due to Adams [1], who formulated
it for L = ∅ and the notions of ε-consistency and ε-entailment (which are equivalent to
p-consistency and p-entailment, respectively).
Theorem 3.7 (Adams [1]). A p-consistent conditional knowledge base KB = (L,D) p-
entails a default ψ ← φ iff (L,D ∪ {¬ψ ← φ}) is p-inconsistent.
3.3. Entailment in System Z
We next recall Pearl’s entailment in System Z [34,58], denoted z-entailment. In the
sequel, let KB = (L,D) be a p-consistent conditional knowledge base.
Entailment in System Z is linked to an ordered partition of D, a default ranking z on KB,
and a world ranking κz. The z-partition of KB is the unique ordered partition (D0, . . . ,Dk)
of D such that each Di is the set of all d ∈⋃kj=i Dj tolerated under L by ⋃kj=i Dj . We
next define z and κz. For every j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, each d ∈ Dj is assigned the value j under z.
The world ranking κz on all worlds I is defined by:
κz(I ) =


∞ if I 	|= L;
0 if I |= L∪D;
1 + maxd∈D: I 	|=d z(d) otherwise.
A preference relation on worlds I and I ′ is then defined as follows. We say that I is z-
preferable to I ′ iff κz(I ) < κz(I ′). A model I of a set of events F (that is, I is a world
that satisfies F ) is a z-minimal model of F iff no model of F is z-preferable to I . Note
that even though the default ranking z and the world ranking κz are unique for a given p-
consistent conditional knowledge base KB, there are generally several z-minimal models
of a set of events F .
We now use the above preference relation on worlds to define the notion of z-entailment
as follows. A default ψ ← φ is a z-consequence of KB = (L,D), denoted KB |∼ zψ ← φ,
iff ψ is true in all z-minimal models of L∪ {φ}.
3.4. Lexicographic entailment
We finally recall Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment [46], denoted lex-entailment. In
the sequel, let KB = (L,D) be a p-consistent conditional knowledge base.
We use the z-partition (D0, . . . ,Dk) of KB to define a lexicographic preference relation
on worlds as follows. A world I is lexicographically preferable (or lex-preferable) to a
world I ′ iff some i ∈ {0, . . . , k} exists such that |{d ∈ Di | I |= d}| > |{d ∈ Di | I ′ |= d}|
and |{d ∈ Dj | I |= d}| = |{d ∈ Dj | I ′ |= d}| for all i < j  k. A model I of a set of
events F is a lexicographically minimal (or lex-minimal) model of F iff no model of F is
lex-preferable to I .
The lexicographic preference relation (which can also be expressed in terms of a unique
world ranking) is then used as follows to define the notion of lex-entailment. A default
ψ ← φ is a lexicographic consequence (or lex-consequence) of KB, denoted KB |∼ lexψ ←
φ, iff ψ is true in all lex-minimal models of L∪ {φ}.
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In this section, we present the new probabilistic formalisms, called weak nonmonotonic
probabilistic logics, which allow for dealing with strict logical knowledge, default logi-
cal knowledge, and purely probabilistic knowledge in a uniform framework. To this end,
we define a new semantics of probabilistic knowledge bases, where probabilistic logic is
combined with Kraus et al.’s entailment in System P , Pearl’s entailment in System Z, and
Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment.
The new semantics of probabilistic knowledge bases KB = (L,P ) is essentially ob-
tained by defining probability and conditional constraint rankings, which generalize world
and default rankings, respectively, for conditional knowledge bases. Under the new seman-
tics, conditional constraints of the form (ψ |φ)[1,1] and (ψ |φ)[0,0] in P then behave as
the defaults ψ ← φ and ¬ψ ← φ, respectively.
Example 4.1 (Ostriches cont’d). The probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) in Table 4
encodes the strict logical knowledge “all ostriches are birds”, the default logical knowledge
“generally, birds have legs” and “generally, birds fly”, and the purely probabilistic knowl-
edge “ostriches fly with a probability of at most 0.05”.
It is important to point out that we generally cannot simply interpret KB in probabilistic
logic, since then (ψ |φ)[1,1] and (ψ |φ)[0,0] in P have the meaning of the strict sentences
ψ ⇐ φ and ¬ψ ⇐ φ in L, and not of the defaults ψ ← φ and ¬ψ ← φ, respectively. The
following example illustrates this aspect.
Example 4.2 (Ostriches cont’d). The probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) in Ta-
ble 4 has the probabilistic interpretation Pr1 in Table 6 as a model. This shows that KB is
satisfiable. Some logical consequences of KB are given as follows:
KB ||= (legs | bird)[1,1], KB ||= (fly | bird)[1,1].
Table 4
Probabilistic knowledge base KB
KB = (L,P ) Type of knowledge
L = {bird ⇐ ostrich} strict logical knowledge
P = {(legs | bird)[1,1], (fly | bird)[1,1], default logical knowledge
(fly | ostrich)[0,0.05]} purely probabilistic knowledge
Table 5
Tight conclusions from KB under logical and s-entailment, where s ∈ {lex,z,p}
(ψ |φ) ||=tight ‖∼ lextight ‖∼ ztight ‖∼
p
tight
(legs | bird) [1,1] [1,1] [1,1] [1,1]
(fly | bird) [1,1] [1,1] [1,1] [1,1]
(legs | ostrich) [1,0] [1,1] [0,1] [0,1]
(fly | ostrich) [1,0] [0,0.05] [0,0.05] [0,0.05]
(fly | red ∧ bird) [1,1] [1,1] [1,1] [0,1]
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logical consequences of KB. They are also the desired conclusions from KB (cf. Exam-
ple 1.3). Some other tight logical consequences of KB are as follows:
KB ||=tight (legs | ostrich)[1,0], KB ||=tight (fly | ostrich)[1,0].
Here, the empty interval “[1,0]” is due to the fact that in probabilistic logic the abil-
ity to fly of birds is interpreted as strict logical knowledge, and inherited from birds to
the subclass of ostriches. There, it is incompatible with the purely probabilistic knowl-
edge that ostriches are able to fly with a probability of at most 0.05. Thus, our knowledge
about ostriches is locally inconsistent in the sense that there exists no model Pr of L ∪ P
with Pr(ostrich) > 0. This is why we obtain (legs | ostrich)[1,0] and (fly | ostrich)[1,0]
rather than the desired tight conclusions (legs | ostrich)[1,1] and (fly | ostrich)[0,0.05]
(cf. Example 1.3), respectively. Finally, another tight logical consequence of KB is given
by KB ||=tight (fly | red ∧ bird)[1,1], which is also a desired tight conclusion from KB (cf.
Example 1.3). Observe that for this last conclusion, probabilistic interpretations Pr are de-
fined over the set of all truth assignments I to the basic events ostrich, bird, legs, fly, and
red.
4.1. Preliminaries
We now define some probabilistic generalizations of concepts from default reasoning
from Section 3.1. In particular, we define probability and conditional constraint rankings
as well as their admissibility with probabilistic knowledge bases.
A probabilistic interpretation Pr verifies a conditional constraint (ψ |φ)[l, u] iff
Pr(φ) > 0 and Pr |= (ψ |φ)[l, u]. We say that Pr falsifies (ψ |φ)[l, u] iff Pr(φ) > 0 and
Pr 	|= (ψ |φ)[l, u]. A set of conditional constraints P tolerates a conditional constraint C
under a set of logical constraints L iff L ∪ P has a model that verifies C. We say P is
under L in conflict with C iff no model of L∪ P verifies C.
In the sequel, we use α > 0 to abbreviate the probabilistic formula ¬(α|)[0,0]. Infor-
mally, a probabilistic interpretation Pr satisfies α > 0 iff Pr(α) > 0. A probability ranking
κ is a function that associates with every probabilistic interpretation Pr on IΦ a value
from {0,1, . . .} ∪ {∞} such that κ(Pr) = 0 for at least one Pr. It is extended to all log-
ical constraints and probabilistic formulas F as follows. If F is satisfiable, then κ(F ) =
min{κ(Pr) | Pr |= F }; otherwise, κ(F ) = ∞. A probability ranking κ is admissible with a
probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) iff κ(¬(ψ |φ)[1,1]) = ∞ for all ψ ⇐ φ ∈ L,
as well as κ(φ > 0) < ∞ and κ(φ > 0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[l, u]) < κ(φ > 0 ∧ ¬(ψ |φ)[l, u]) for all
(ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ P . Informally, the latter says that for every (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ P , it holds that (i)
Pr(φ) > 0 and κ(Pr) < ∞ for some probabilistic interpretation Pr, and (ii) the minimal
κ(Pr) of all Pr verifying (ψ |φ)[l, u] is less than the minimal κ(Pr) of all Pr falsifying
(ψ |φ)[l, u].
Example 4.3 (Ostriches cont’d). Table 6 shows some probabilistic interpretations Pr1, . . . ,
Pr8, and Table 7 gives their values under some probability rankings κ1, κ2, and κ3. Ob-
serve that κ3 is not admissible with KB = (L,P ) in Table 4, since bird ⇐ ostrich is in L,
but κ3(¬(bird | ostrich)[1,1])  κ3(Pr8) = 1 < ∞. Moreover, (fly | ostrich)[0,0.05] is in
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Some probabilistic interpretations Pr1, . . . ,Pr8
ostrich bird legs fly Pr1 Pr2 Pr3 Pr4 Pr5 Pr6 Pr7 Pr8
I1 true true true true 0 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0
I2 true true true false 0 1 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5
I3 true true false true 0 0 0.05 0 1 0 0.5 0
I4 true true false false 0 0 0.95 0 0 0 0.5 0
I5 true false true true 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I6 true false true false 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
I7 true false false true 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I8 true false false false 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I9 false true true true 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I10 false true true false 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I11 false true false true 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I12 false true false false 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I13 false false true true 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I14 false false true false 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I15 false false false true 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I16 false false false false 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 7
Values of Pr1, . . . ,Pr8 under some probability rankings κ1, κ2, and κ3
(legs | bird)[1,1] (fly | bird)[1,1] (fly | ostrich)[0,0.05] κ1 κ2 κ3
Pr1 true true true 0 0 0
Pr2 true false true 1 1 1
Pr3 false false true 1 2 1
Pr4 true true false 2 3 0
Pr5 false true false 2 4 2
Pr6 true false false 2 4 2
Pr7 false false false 2 5 2
Pr8 true false true ∞ ∞ 1
P , but κ3(ostrich > 0 ∧ ¬(fly | ostrich)[0,0.05])  κ3(Pr4) = 0  κ3(ostrich > 0 ∧ (fly |
ostrich)[0,0.05]). Note that on Pr1, . . . ,Pr8, the rankings κ1 and κ2 coincide with the
unique rankings associated with KB in probabilistic z- and lex-entailment (cf. Sections 4.3
and 4.4), respectively.
A conditional constraint ranking on a probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) is a
mapping σ that associates with every conditional constraint C ∈ P a nonnegative integer.
If P 	= ∅, then σ is admissible with KB iff every P ′ ⊆ P that is under L in conflict with
some C ∈ P contains some C′ with σ(C′) < σ(C); if P = ∅, then σ is admissible with KB
iff L is satisfiable. Notice that conditional constraint rankings σ are defined on the set of all
conditional constraints in P and have values from {0,1, . . .}, while probability rankings κ
are defined on the set of all probabilistic interpretations Pr on IΦ and have values from
{0,1, . . .} ∪ {∞}.
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knowledge base KB in Table 4 is given by σ((legs | bird)[1,1]) = σ((fly | bird)[1,1]) =
0 and σ((fly | ostrich)[0, 0.05]) = 1. It is not difficult to see that σ is admissible with
KB. In fact, σ is the unique conditional constraint ranking that is associated with KB in
probabilistic z-entailment (cf. Sections 4.3).
4.2. Probabilistic consistency and entailment in System P
We now define a semantics of probabilistic knowledge bases, where probabilistic logic
is combined with System P [40]. More precisely, we generalize the notions of consistency
and entailment in System P that are based on world rankings to probabilistic knowl-
edge bases. We call these generalizations probabilistic p-consistency and probabilistic
p-entailment (or simply p-consistency and p-entailment), respectively. Interestingly, these
probabilistic notions of consistency and entailment coincide with the probabilistic notions
of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment for imprecise probability assessments (cf. Sec-
tion 8.2). In the following, we first define the probabilistic generalizations of consistency
and entailment in System P , and we then give some equivalent characterizations of them.
In the sequel, let KB = (L,P ) be a probabilistic knowledge base. We say KB is p-
consistent iff there exists a probability ranking κ that is admissible with KB. We then define
the notion of p-entailment for p-consistent KB in terms of admissible probability rankings
as follows. A conditional constraint (ψ |φ)[l, u] is a p-consequence of KB, denoted KB ‖∼ p
(ψ |φ)[l, u], iff κ(φ > 0) = ∞ or κ(φ > 0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[l, u]) < κ(φ > 0 ∧ ¬(ψ |φ)[l, u])
for every probability ranking κ admissible with KB. We say (ψ |φ)[l, u] is a tight p-
consequence of KB, denoted KB‖∼ ptight (ψ |φ)[l, u], iff l = sup l′ (resp., u = infu′) subject
to KB ‖∼ p(ψ |φ)[l′, u′].
The following result is a probabilistic generalization of Theorem 3.5. It says that the
notion of p-consistency of a probabilistic knowledge base KB is equivalent to the existence
of an admissible conditional constraint ranking. It is proved by showing that a probability
ranking κ that is admissible with KB can be used to define a conditional constraint ranking
σ that is admissible with KB, and vice versa.
Theorem 4.5. A probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) is p-consistent iff there exists
a conditional constraint ranking on KB that is admissible with KB.
Based on this result, we also obtain a probabilistic generalization of Theorem 3.6, which
says that the p-consistency of a probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) is equivalent
to the existence of an ordered partition of P with certain properties.
Theorem 4.6. A probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) is p-consistent iff there exists
an ordered partition (P0, . . . ,Pk) of P such that either (a) or (b) holds:
(a) Every Pi , 0 i  k, is the set of all F ∈⋃kj=i Pj tolerated under L by ⋃kj=i Pj .
(b) For every i, 0 i  k, each F ∈ Pi is tolerated under L by ⋃kj=i Pj .
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is p-consistent, since condition (a) as well as condition (b) of Theorem 4.6 hold for the
following ordered partition (P0,P1) of P :
(P0,P1) =
({(legs | bird)[1,1], (fly | bird)[1,1]}, {(fly | ostrich)[0,0.05]}).
More precisely, to see that (P0,P1) satisfies (b), observe that Pr1 in Table 6 satisfies L∪P
and verifies (legs | bird)[1,1] and (fly | bird)[1,1], while Pr2 satisfies L ∪ P1 and verifies
(fly | ostrich)[0,0.05]. To see that also (a) holds, observe that no Pr satisfies L ∪ P and
also verifies (fly | ostrich)[0,0.05] (cf. Example 4.2).
The following two theorems are a probabilistic generalization of Theorem 3.7. They
say that the notion of p-entailment for probabilistic knowledge bases can be expressed in
terms of the notion of p-consistency. The first theorem is on the notion of p-consequence,
while the second one is on tight p-consequence.
Theorem 4.8. Let KB = (L,P ) be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let
(β|α)[l, u] be a conditional constraint. Then, KB‖∼ p(β|α)[l, u] iff (L,P ∪{(β|α)[p,p]})
is not p-consistent for all p ∈ [0, l)∪ (u,1].
Theorem 4.9. Let KB = (L,P ) be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let
(β|α)[l, u] be a conditional constraint. Then, KB ‖∼ ptight(β|α)[l, u] iff
(i) (L,P ∪ {(β|α)[p,p]}) is not p-consistent for all p ∈ [0, l)∪ (u,1], and
(ii) (L,P ∪ {(β|α)[p,p]}) is p-consistent for all p ∈ [l, u].
The next two theorems show that p-consistency and p-entailment coincide with the
probabilistic notions of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment, respectively, for imprecise
probability assessments (cf. Section 8.2). They follow from Theorems 4.5 and 4.8 as well
as similar characterizations of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment through conditional
constraint rankings, presented in [10,11].
Theorem 4.10. Let KB = (L,P ) be a probabilistic knowledge base. Then, KB is p-
consistent iff KB is g-coherent.
Theorem 4.11. Let KB = (L,P ) be p-consistent, and let (β|α)[l, u] be a conditional con-
straint. Then, KB‖∼ p(β|α)[l, u] iff KB‖∼ g(β|α)[l, u].
The following example illustrates the probabilistic notion of p-entailment. In particular,
it shows that p-entailment does not realize an inheritance of default logical knowledge
along subclass relationships. See Section 6 for algorithms for deciding p-consistency and
computing tight p-consequences.
Example 4.12 (Ostriches cont’d). Consider again KB given in Table 4. Some tight p-
consequences of KB are shown in Table 5. More precisely, (legs | bird)[1,1], (fly |
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thermore, (legs | ostrich)[0,1] and (fly | red ∧ bird)[0,1] are also tight p-consequences of
KB. But they differ from the desired ones (legs | ostrich)[1,1] and (legs | red ∧ bird)[1,1],
respectively. Here, we observe that p-entailment does not inherit default logical knowledge
along subclass relationships.
4.3. Probabilistic entailment in System Z
We next extend Pearl’s System Z [34,58] to p-consistent probabilistic knowledge bases
KB = (L,P ). The new notion of entailment in System Z, called probabilistic z-entailment
(or simply z-entailment), is associated with an ordered partition of P , a conditional con-
straint ranking z on KB, and a probability ranking κz.
The z-partition of KB is the unique ordered partition (P0, . . . ,Pk) of P such that each
Pi , 0ik, is the set of all C ∈⋃kj=i Pj tolerated under L by ⋃kj=i Pj .
Example 4.13 (Ostriches cont’d). The z-partition of KB in Table 4 is given by the ordered
partition (P0,P1) described in Example 4.7.
The conditional constraint ranking z and the probability ranking κz are defined as fol-
lows. For every j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, each C ∈ Pj is assigned the value j under z. The probability
ranking κz on all probabilistic interpretations Pr is then defined by:
κz(Pr) =


∞ if Pr 	|= L;
0 if Pr |= L∪ P ;
1 + maxC∈P : Pr 	|=C z(C) otherwise.
The following lemma shows that z is a conditional constraint ranking on KB that is admis-
sible with KB, and κz is a probability ranking that is admissible with KB.
Lemma 4.14. Let KB = (L,P ) be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base. Then, (a)
z and (b) κz are both admissible with KB.
We define a preference relation on probabilistic interpretations as follows. For proba-
bilistic interpretations Pr and Pr′, we say Pr is z-preferable to Pr′ iff κz(Pr) < κz(Pr′).
A model Pr of a set of logical constraints and probabilistic formulas F is a z-minimal
model of F iff no model of F is z-preferable to Pr.
We are now ready to define the notion of z-entailment. A conditional constraint
(ψ |φ)[l, u] is a z-consequence of KB, denoted KB ‖∼ z(ψ |φ)[l, u], iff every z-minimal
model of L ∪ {φ > 0} satisfies (ψ |φ)[l, u]. We say (ψ |φ)[l, u] is a tight z-consequence
of KB, denoted KB ‖∼ ztight(ψ |φ)[l, u], iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of
Pr(ψ |φ) subject to all z-minimal models Pr of L∪ {φ > 0}.
The following example illustrates the probabilistic notion of z-entailment. In particular,
it shows that z-entailment differs from p-entailment in the sense that z-entailment realizes
an inheritance of default logical properties from classes to non-exceptional subclasses. But
z-entailment does not inherit default logical properties from classes to subclasses that are
exceptional relative to some other property (and thus, like its classical counterpart, has
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entailment are given in Section 6.
Example 4.15 (Ostriches cont’d). Some tight conclusions under z-entailment from the
probabilistic knowledge base KB in Table 4 are shown in Table 5. More precisely, we obtain
the desired tight conclusions (legs | bird)[1,1], (fly | bird)[1,1], (fly | ostrich)[0,0.05], and
(fly | red ∧ bird)[1,1]. However, we also obtain the tight conclusion (legs | ostrich)[0,1]
instead of the desired one (legs | ostrich)[1,1]. Here, the interval “[0,1]” is due to the fact
that the default logical property of having legs is not inherited from birds to its exceptional
subclass of ostriches.
The following theorem characterizes the notion of z-consequence in terms of the prob-
ability ranking κz (and thus relates z-entailment to p-entailment).
Theorem 4.16. Let KB = (L,P ) be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let
C = (ψ |φ)[l, u] be a conditional constraint. Then, KB ‖∼ zC iff κz(φ > 0) = ∞ or κz(φ >
0 ∧C) < κz(φ > 0 ∧¬C).
4.4. Probabilistic lexicographic entailment
We finally define a generalization of Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment [46] to p-
consistent probabilistic knowledge bases KB = (L,P ), which we call probabilistic lexi-
cographic entailment (or simply lex-entailment). Note that, even though we do not use
probability rankings here, the new notion of lex-entailment can be easily expressed through
a unique single probability ranking.
We use the z-partition (P0, . . . ,Pk) of KB to define a lexicographic preference relation
on probabilistic interpretations as follows. For probabilistic interpretations Pr and Pr′, we
say Pr is lexicographically preferable (or lex-preferable) to Pr′ iff some i ∈ {0, . . . , k}
exists such that |{C ∈ Pi | Pr |= C}| > |{C ∈ Pi | Pr′ |= C}| and |{C ∈ Pj | Pr |= C}| =
|{C ∈ Pj | Pr′ |= C}| for all i < j  k. A model Pr of a set of logical constraints and
probabilistic formulas F is a lexicographically minimal (or lex-minimal) model of F iff
no model of F is lex-preferable to Pr.
We are now ready to define the notion of lex-entailment as follows. A conditional
constraint (ψ |φ)[l, u] is a lex-consequence of KB, denoted KB ‖∼ lex(ψ |φ)[l, u], iff each
lex-minimal model of L ∪ {φ > 0} satisfies (ψ |φ)[l, u]. We say (ψ |φ)[l, u] is a tight
lex-consequence of KB, denoted KB ‖∼ lextight (ψ |φ)[l, u], iff l = inf Pr(ψ |φ) (resp., u =
sup Pr(ψ |φ)) subject to all lex-minimal models Pr of L∪ {φ > 0}.
In the following example, lex-entailment realizes a correct inheritance of default log-
ical properties, without showing the problem of inheritance blocking. See Section 6 for
algorithms for computing tight intervals under lex-entailment.
Example 4.17 (Ostriches cont’d). Consider again the probabilistic knowledge base KB
given in Table 4. Some tight lex-consequences are shown in Table 5. Observe that we obtain
all the desired tight conclusions (legs | bird)[1,1], (fly | bird)[1,1], (legs | ostrich)[1,1],
(fly | ostrich)[0,0.05], and (fly | red ∧ bird)[1,1].
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In this section, we explore the semantic properties of the new notions of p-, z-, and
lex-entailment, and give a comparison to logical entailment in probabilistic logic. We first
describe their nonmonotonicity and nonmonotonic properties. We then explore the rela-
tionships between the formalisms and to their classical counterparts.
5.1. Nonmonotonicity
In the sequel, we denote by ‖∼ a generic notion of entailment for probabilistic
knowledge bases KB = (L,P ), which relates KB to its entailed conditional constraints
(ψ |φ)[l, u]. The notion of logical entailment ||= has the following property of inheritance
of logical knowledge (L-INH) along subclass relationships (recall that KB ||=F iff every
model Pr of L∪ P is also a model of F ; see Section 2.2):
L-INH. If KB ‖∼ (ψ |φ)[c, c] and φ ⇐ φ	 is valid, then KB ‖∼ (ψ |φ	)[c, c],
for all events ψ , φ, and φ	, all probabilistic knowledge bases KB, and all c ∈ {0,1}. The
notions of p-, z-, and lex-entailment ‖∼ p , ‖∼ z, and ‖∼ lex are nonmonotonic in the sense
that they all do not satisfy L-INH. Here, p-entailment completely fails L-INH, while z- and
lex-entailment realize some weaker form of L-INH.
Notice that logical, p-, z-, and lex-entailment all do not have the property of inheritance
of purely probabilistic knowledge (P-INH) along subclass relationships:
P-INH. If KB ‖∼ (ψ |φ)[l, u] and φ ⇐ φ	 is valid, then KB ‖∼ (ψ |φ	)[l, u],
for all events ψ , φ, and φ	, all probabilistic knowledge bases KB, and all [l, u] ⊆ [0,1]
different from [0,0], [1,1], and [1,0]. See [52] for entailment semantics that satisfy P-
INH and restricted forms of P-INH. For example, under such entailment semantics, we
can draw the conclusion (fly | eagle)[0.95,1] from the probabilistic knowledge base KB =
({bird ⇐ eagle}, {(fly | bird)[0.95,1]}).
5.2. Nonmonotonic properties
We now explore the nonmonotonic behavior (especially related to the above property L-
INH) of the probabilistic formalisms of this paper. We consider the KLM postulates [40],
the property Rational Monotonicity (RM) [40], and the properties Irrelevance (Irr) and
Conditioning (Con) (adapted from [7] and [61], respectively). An overview of the results
on nonmonotonic properties is given in Table 8.
The rationality postulates of System P , namely, Right Weakening (RW), Reflexivity
(Ref ), Left Logical Equivalence (LLE), Cut, Cautious Monotonicity (CM), and Or pro-
posed by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [40], also called KLM postulates, are commonly
regarded as being particularly desirable for any reasonable notion of nonmonotonic entail-
ment. The following result shows that the notions of logical, p-, z-, and lex-entailment all
satisfy (probabilistic versions of) these postulates.
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Nonmonotonic properties of probabilistic formalisms
Property ||= ‖∼ lex ‖∼ z ‖∼p
KLM postulates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rational Monotonicity Yes Yes Yes No
Irrelevance Yes Yes Yes No
Conditioning Yes Yes Yes Yes
Theorem 5.1. Every notion of entailment ‖∼ among ||=, ‖∼ p , ‖∼ z, and ‖∼ lex satisfies
the following properties for all probabilistic knowledge bases KB = (L,P ), all events ε,
ε′, φ, and ψ , and all real numbers l, l′, u,u′ ∈ [0,1]:
RW. If (φ|)[l, u] ⇒ (ψ |)[l′, u′] is logically valid and KB ‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u], then KB ‖∼
(ψ |ε)[l′, u′].
Ref. KB ‖∼ (ε|ε)[1,1].
LLE. If ε ⇔ ε′ is logically valid, then KB‖∼ (φ|ε)[l, u] iff KB ‖∼ (φ|ε′)[l, u].
Cut. If KB ‖∼ (ε|ε′)[1,1] and KB ‖∼ (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u], then KB ‖∼ (φ|ε′)[l, u].
CM. If KB ‖∼ (ε|ε′)[1,1] and KB ‖∼ (φ|ε′)[l, u], then KB‖∼ (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u].
Or. If KB ‖∼ (φ|ε)[1,1] and KB ‖∼ (φ|ε′)[1,1], then KB‖∼ (φ|ε∨ ε′)[1,1].
Another desirable property is Rational Monotonicity (RM) [40], which describes a re-
stricted form of monotony, and allows to ignore certain kinds of irrelevant knowledge.
The next theorem shows that logical, z-, and lex-entailment all satisfy RM. Note that here
KB 	‖∼C denotes that KB ‖∼C does not hold.
Theorem 5.2. ||=, ‖∼ z, and ‖∼ lex satisfy the following property for all probabilistic
knowledge bases KB = (L,P ) and all events ε, ε′, and ψ :
RM. If KB ‖∼ (ψ |ε)[1,1] and KB 	‖∼ (¬ε′|ε)[1,1], then KB ‖∼ (ψ |ε ∧ ε′)[1,1].
The notion of p-entailment, however, generally does not satisfy the property RM, as the
following example shows.
Example 5.3. Consider the following probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ):
(L,P ) = ({bird ⇐ eagle}, {(fly | bird)[1,1]}).
Here, (fly | bird)[1,1] is a logical (resp., p-, z-, and lex-) consequence of KB, and (¬eagle |
bird)[1,1] is not a logical (resp., p-, z-, and lex-) consequence of KB. Observe now that
(fly | bird ∧ eagle)[1,1] is a logical (resp., z- and lex-) consequence of KB, but (fly | bird ∧
eagle)[1,1] is not a p-consequence of KB. Note that (fly | bird ∧ eagle)[1,1] is a tight
logical (resp., z- and lex-) consequence of KB, while (fly | bird ∧ eagle)[0,1] is a tight
p-consequence of KB.
We next consider the property Irrelevance (Irr) adapted from [7]. Informally, Irr says
that ε′ is irrelevant to a conclusion “P ‖∼ (ψ |ε)[1,1]” when they are defined over disjoint
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satisfy the property Irr.
Theorem 5.4. ||=, ‖∼ z, and ‖∼ lex satisfy the following property for all probabilistic
knowledge bases KB = (L,P ) and all events ε, ε′, and ψ :
Irr. If KB ‖∼ (ψ |ε)[1,1], and no basic event of KB and (ψ |ε)[1,1] occurs in ε′, then
KB ‖∼ (ψ |ε∧ε′)[1,1].
The notion of p-entailment, however, does not satisfy Irr. This is already clear from the
tight p-consequence (fly | red ∧ bird)[0,1] of KB in Table 4 (cf. Example 4.12). It is also
shown by the following (less complex) example.
Example 5.5. Consider the following probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ):
(L,P ) = (∅, {(fly | bird)[1,1]}).
Here, (fly | bird)[1,1] is a logical (resp., p-, z-, and lex-) consequence of KB. Observe
now that (fly | red ∧ bird)[1,1] is a logical (resp., z- and lex-) consequence of KB, but
(fly | red ∧ bird)[1,1] is not a p-consequence of KB. Note that (fly | red ∧ bird)[1,1] is a
tight logical (resp., z- and lex-) consequence of KB, while (fly | red ∧ bird)[0,1] is a tight
p-consequence of KB.
Finally, the properties Conditioning (Con) (adapted from [61]) and Inclusion (Inc) ex-
press that KB should entail all its own conditional constraints. The following result shows
that logical, p-, z-, and lex-entailment all satisfy Con and Inc. Obviously, Con implies Inc;
conversely, Inc and LLE imply Con.
Theorem 5.6. ||=, ‖∼ p , ‖∼ z, and ‖∼ lex satisfy the following properties for all probabilis-
tic knowledge bases KB = (L,P ), all events ε, φ, and ψ , and all l, u ∈ [0,1]:
Con. If (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ P and ε ⇔ φ is logically valid, then KB ‖∼ (ψ |ε)[l, u].
Inc. If (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ P , then KB‖∼ (ψ |φ)[l, u].
5.3. Relationships between probabilistic formalisms
In this section, we investigate the relationships between the different probabilistic
formalisms. The following theorem shows that logical entailment is stronger than lex-
entailment, and that the latter is stronger than z-entailment, which in turn is stronger than
p-entailment. That is, the logical implications illustrated by the upper horizontal line of
arrows in Fig. 1 hold between the probabilistic formalisms. Note that similar logical im-
plications hold between their classical counterparts (which are illustrated by the lower
horizontal line of arrows in Fig. 1).
Theorem 5.7. Let KB = (L,P ) be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let
C = (ψ |φ)[l, u] be a conditional constraint. Then,
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(a) KB ‖∼ pC implies KB‖∼ zC.
(b) KB ‖∼ zC implies KB ‖∼ lexC.
(c) KB ‖∼ lexC implies KB ||=C.
In general, none of the converse implications holds, as Table 5 immediately shows.
However, if L ∪ P has a model where the conditioning event φ has a positive probability,
then logical, z-, and lex-entailment of (ψ |φ)[l, u] from KB all coincide. Roughly, in this
special case, it is consistent to transform all defaults β ← α in P that are relevant to a con-
clusion of (ψ |φ)[l, u] from KB into strict logical constraints β ⇐ α in L. This important
result is expressed by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.8. Let KB = (L,P ) be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let
C = (ψ |φ)[l, u] be a conditional constraint such that L∪P has a model Pr with Pr(φ) >
0. Then, KB ||=C iff KB ‖∼ lexC iff KB ‖∼ zC.
The following example shows that p-entailment, however, generally does not coincide
with logical entailment when L∪ P has a model Pr with Pr(φ) > 0.
Example 5.9. Consider KB = (L,P ) = ({bird ⇐ eagle}, {(fly | bird)[1,1]}). Here, L ∪ P
has a model Pr with Pr(eagle) > 0, and (fly | eagle)[1,1] is a logical (resp., z- and lex-)
consequence of KB, but (fly | eagle)[1,1] is not a p-consequence of KB. Note that (fly |
eagle)[1,1] is a tight logical (resp., z- and lex-) consequence of KB, while (fly | eagle)[0,1]
is a tight p-consequence of KB.
5.4. Relationships to classical formalisms
Finally, we explore the relationships between p-, z-, and lex-entailment and their
classical counterparts. The following result shows that p-, z-, and lex-entailment for
p-consistent probabilistic knowledge bases generalize their classical counterparts for p-
consistent conditional knowledge bases. Here, the operator γ on conditional constraints,
sets of conditional constraints, and conditional knowledge bases replaces each conditional
constraint (ψ |φ)[1,1] by the default ψ ← φ. By Theorems 2.4 and 2.5, logical entailment
in probabilistic logic similarly generalizes its classical counterpart. All this is illustrated by
the vertical arrows in Fig. 1.
Theorem 5.10. Let KB = (L, {(ψi |φi)[1,1] | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}) be a p-consistent probabilis-
tic knowledge base, and let (β|α)[1,1] be a conditional constraint. Then,
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(b) KB ‖∼ z(β|α)[1,1] iff γ (KB) |∼ zβ ← α.
(c) KB ‖∼ lex(β|α)[1,1] iff γ (KB) |∼ lexβ ← α.
6. Algorithms
In this section, we provide algorithms for the main reasoning problems in weak non-
monotonic probabilistic logics.
6.1. Overview
The main decision and optimization problems of probabilistic reasoning in weak non-
monotonic probabilistic logics are summarized as follows:
p-CONSISTENCY: Given a probabilistic knowledge base KB, decide whether KB is p-
consistent.
S-CONSEQUENCE: Given a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base KB and a condi-
tional constraint (β|α)[l, u], decide whether KB ‖∼ s(β|α)[l, u] holds, for some
fixed semantics s ∈ {p,z, lex}.
TIGHT S-CONSEQUENCE: Given a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base KB and a
conditional event β|α, compute l, u ∈ [0,1] such that KB ‖∼ s(β|α)[l, u], for some
fixed semantics s ∈ {p,z, lex}.
The basic idea behind the algorithms below for solving the above decision and optimization
problems is to perform a reduction to the following standard decision and optimization
problems in model-theoretic probabilistic logic:
POSITIVE PROBABILITY: Given a probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) and an
event α, decide whether L∪ P has a model Pr such that Pr(α) > 0.
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE: Given a probabilistic knowledge base KB and a conditional
constraint (β|α)[l, u], decide whether KB ||= (β|α)[l, u] holds.
TIGHT LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE: Given a probabilistic knowledge base KB and a con-
ditional event β|α, compute l, u ∈ [0,1] such that KB ||=tight (β|α)[l, u].
The problems POSITIVE PROBABILITY and LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE can be reduced
to the problem of deciding whether a system of linear constraints is solvable, while TIGHT
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE is reducible to computing the optimal solutions of two linear
optimization problems; cf. especially [19,39,51].
Since the notions of p-consistency and p-entailment coincide with the notions of
g-coherence and g-coherent entailment (cf. Section 8.2), existing algorithms for decid-
ing g-coherence and computing tight intervals under g-coherent entailment can be used
for solving p-CONSISTENCY and TIGHT p-CONSEQUENCE, respectively. Such algo-
rithms are shown in Figs. 2 and 4, respectively. Here, the one in Fig. 2 also computes
the z-partition of KB, if KB is p-consistent; it is similar to the algorithm for deciding
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Input: probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ).
Output: z-partition of KB, if KB is p-consistent; nil otherwise.
1. if P = ∅ then if L is satisfiable then return () else return nil;
2. R := P ;
3. i := −1;
4. repeat
5. i := i + 1;
6. D[i] := {(ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ R | L∪R ∪ {φ > 0} is satisfiable};
7. R := R \D[i]
8. until R = ∅ or D[i] = ∅;
9. if R = ∅ then return (D[0], . . . ,D[i]) else return nil.
Fig. 2. Algorithm p-consistency.
Algorithm tight-p-consequence (essentially Biazzo et al. [9])
Input: p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base KB=(L,P ), conditional event β|α.
Output: interval [l, u] ⊆ [0,1] such that KB‖∼ptight(β|α)[l, u].
1. R := P ;
2. repeat
3.  := {(ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ R | L∪R ∪ {⊥ ⇐ α} ∪ {φ > 0} is satisfiable};
4. R := R \
5. until  = ∅;
6. compute l, u ∈ [0,1] such that L∪R ||=tight (β|α)[l, u];
7. return [l, u].
Fig. 3. Algorithm tight-p-consequence.
ε-consistency in default reasoning by Goldszmidt and Pearl [32]. The algorithm in Fig. 4
is based on the result that the notion of p-entailment from KB coincides with logical en-
tailment from a unique subbase of KB. The decision problem p-CONSEQUENCE can be
solved in a similar way.
In the next subsection, we provide algorithms for solving the optimization prob-
lems TIGHT z- and TIGHT lex-CONSEQUENCE. The decision problems z- and lex-
CONSEQUENCE can be solved in a similar way.
6.2. Tight z- and lex-consequence
We now give algorithms for solving TIGHT z- and TIGHT lex-CONSEQUENCE. In
the sequel, let KB = (L,P ) be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let
(P0, . . . ,Pk) be its z-partition. We first give some preparatory definitions.
For G,H ⊆ P , we say G is z-preferable to H iff some i ∈ {0, . . . , k} exists such that
Pi ⊆ G, Pi 	⊆H , and Pj ⊆ G and Pj ⊆ H for all i < j  k. We say G is lex-preferable to
H iff some i ∈ {0, . . . , k} exists such that |G∩Pi | > |H ∩Pi | and |G∩Pj | = |H ∩Pj | for
all i < j  k. For D ⊆ 2P and s ∈ {z, lex}, we say G is s-minimal in D iff G ∈D and no
H ∈D is s-preferable to G.
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Input: p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base KB=(L,P ), conditional event β|α.
Output: interval [l, u] ⊆ [0,1] such that KB‖∼ z(β|α)[l, u].
Notation: (P0, . . . ,Pk) denotes the z-partition of KB.
1. R := L;
2. if R ∪ {α > 0} is unsatisfiable then return [1,0];
3. j := k;
4. while j  0 and R ∪ Pj ∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable do begin
5. R := R ∪ Pj ;
6. j := j − 1
7. end;
8. compute l, u ∈ [0,1] such that R ||=tight (β|α)[l, u];
9. return [l, u].
Fig. 4. Algorithm tight-z-consequence.
The following theorem shows how TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE, where s ∈ {z, lex}, can be
reduced to POSITIVE PROBABILITY and TIGHT LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE. The key idea
behind this reduction is that there exists a set Dsα(KB) ⊆ 2P such that KB ‖∼ s(β|α)[l, u]
iff L∪H ||= (β|α)[l, u] for all H ∈Dsα(KB).
Theorem 6.1. Let KB = (L,P ) be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let
β|α be a conditional event. Let s ∈ {z, lex}. Let Dsα(KB) be the set of all s-minimal
elements in {H ⊆ P | L ∪ H ∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable}. Then, l (resp., u) such that
KB‖∼ stight(β|α)[l, u] is given as follows:
(a) If L∪ {α > 0} is unsatisfiable, then l = 1 (resp., u = 0).
(b) Otherwise, l = min c (resp., u = max d) subject to L∪H ||=tight (β|α)[c, d] and H ∈
Dsα(KB).
For s = z (resp., s = lex), Algorithm tight-s-consequence (see Fig. 4 (resp., 5)) com-
putes tight intervals under s-entailment. Step 2 checks whether L∪{α > 0} is unsatisfiable.
If this is the case, then [1,0] is returned by Theorem 6.1(a). Otherwise, we compute
Dsα(KB) along the z-partition of KB in steps 3–7 (resp., 3–15), and the requested tight
interval using Theorem 6.1(b) in step 8 (resp., 16–20).
7. Computational complexity
In this section, we draw a precise picture of the computational complexity of the deci-
sion and optimization problems described in Section 6.1.
7.1. Complexity classes
We assume some basic knowledge about the complexity classes P, NP, and co-NP. We
now briefly describe some other complexity classes that occur in our results; see especially
[23,38,56] for further background.
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Input: p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base KB=(L,P ), conditional event β|α.
Output: interval [l, u] ⊆ [0,1] such that KB‖∼ lextight(β|α)[l, u].
Notation: (P0, . . . ,Pk) denotes the z-partition of KB.
1. R := L;
2. if R ∪ {α > 0} is unsatisfiable then return [1,0];
3. H := {∅};
4. for j := k downto 0 do begin
5. n := 0 ;
6. H′ := ∅;
7. for each G ⊆ Dj and H ∈H do
8. if R ∪G∪H ∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable then
9. if n = |G| thenH′ :=H′ ∪ {G∪H }
10. else if n < |G| then begin
11. H′ := {G∪H };
12. n := |G|
13. end;
14. H :=H′;
15. end;
16. (l, u) := (1,0);
17. for each H ∈H do begin
18. compute c, d ∈ [0,1] such that R ∪H ||=tight (β|α)[c, d];
19. (l, u) := (min(l, c),max(u, d))
20. end;
21. return [l, u].
Fig. 5. Algorithm tight-lex-consequence.
The class PNP contains all decision problems that can be solved in deterministic poly-
nomial time with an oracle for NP. The class PNP‖ contains the decision problems in PNP
where all oracle calls must be first prepared and then issued in parallel. The relationship
between these complexity classes is described by the following inclusion hierarchy (note
that all inclusions are currently believed to be strict):
P ⊆ NP, co-NP ⊆ PNP‖ ⊆ PNP.
To classify problems that compute an output value, rather than a Yes/ No-answer, function
classes have been introduced. In particular, FP and FPNP are the functional analogs of P
and PNP, respectively.
7.2. Overview of complexity results
In the complexity analysis, we consider the decision and optimization problems s-
CONSEQUENCE and TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE, where s ∈ {z, lex}. We assume that KB
as well as (β|α)[l, u] contain only rational numbers.
The complexity results are compactly summarized in Tables 9–10. In detail, the
problems z-CONSEQUENCE and lex-CONSEQUENCE are complete for the classes PNP‖
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Complexity of z- and lex-CONSEQUENCE
Problem Complexity
z-CONSEQUENCE PNP‖ -complete
lex-CONSEQUENCE PNP-complete
Table 10
Complexity of TIGHT z- and lex-CONSEQUENCE
Problem Complexity
TIGHT z-CONSEQUENCE FPNP-complete
TIGHT lex-CONSEQUENCE FPNP-complete
and PNP, respectively, whereas the problems TIGHT z-CONSEQUENCE and TIGHT lex-
CONSEQUENCE are both complete for the class FPNP.
The hardness results often hold even in the restricted literal-Horn case, where KB and
β|α are both literal-Horn. Here, a conditional event ψ |φ (resp., logical constraint ψ ⇐ φ)
is literal-Horn iff ψ is a basic event (resp., ψ is either a basic event or the negation of a
basic event) and φ is either  or a conjunction of basic events. A conditional constraint
(ψ |φ)[l, u] is literal-Horn iff the conditional event ψ |φ is literal-Horn. A probabilistic
knowledge base KB = (L,P ) is literal-Horn iff every member of L∪ P is literal-Horn.
Note that the problems p-CONSISTENCY, p-CONSEQUENCE and TIGHT p-CON-
SEQUENCE are complete for NP, co-NP, and FPNP, respectively, in the general case and
also in restricted cases. This is immediate by similar complexity results for g-coherence
and g-coherent entailment [9] and the equivalence of these notions to p-consistency and
p-entailment, respectively; cf. Section 8.2. Similarly, also the problems POSITIVE PROBA-
BILITY, LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE, and TIGHT LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE in probabilistic
logic are complete for NP, co-NP, and FPNP, respectively, in the general case and also in
restricted cases; cf. especially [51].
7.3. Detailed complexity results
The following two theorems show that the problems z- and lex-CONSEQUENCE are
complete for the classes PNP‖ and PNP, respectively. Here, hardness for PNP‖ and PNP fol-
lows from Theorem 5.10 and PNP‖ - and PNP-hardness of deciding z- and lex-entailment,
respectively, in classical default reasoning [18].
Theorem 7.1. Given a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base KB, and a conditional
constraint (β|α)[l, u], deciding whether KB‖∼ z(β|α)[l, u] is PNP‖ -complete.
Theorem 7.2. Given a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base KB, and a conditional
constraint (β|α)[l, u], deciding whether KB ‖∼ lex(β|α)[l, u] is PNP-complete. Hardness
holds even if KB and β|α are literal-Horn.
The next two theorems show that TIGHT s-CONSEQUENCE, where s ∈ {z, lex}, is FPNP-
complete. Hardness holds by a polynomial reduction from the FPNP-complete traveling
salesman cost problem [56].
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event β|α, computing l, u ∈ [0,1] such that KB ‖∼ ztight(β|α)[l, u] is FPNP-complete. Hard-
ness holds even if KB and β|α are literal-Horn, and L = ∅.
Theorem 7.4. Given a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base KB, and a conditional
event β|α, computing l, u ∈ [0,1] such that KB ‖∼ lextight(β|α)[l, u] is FPNP-complete. Hard-
ness holds even if KB and β|α are literal-Horn, and L = ∅.
8. Related work
In this section, we give a comparison to the related works on probabilistic default rea-
soning [52] and on probabilistic reasoning under g-coherence [8,27–29].
8.1. Strong nonmonotonic probabilistic logics
A companion paper [52] presents similar probabilistic generalizations of Pearl’s en-
tailment in System Z, Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment, and Geffner’s conditional
entailment [24,26]. These formalisms, however, are quite different from the ones in this
paper, since they allow for handling default purely probabilistic knowledge rather than
(strict) purely probabilistic knowledge in addition to strict logical knowledge and default
logical knowledge. More precisely, the formalisms in [52] are an extension of a variant
of probabilistic logic (in which purely probabilistic conditional constraints are interpreted
as default sentences) by defaults as in conditional knowledge bases, while the formalisms
here are an extension of probabilistic logic (in which purely probabilistic conditional con-
straints are interpreted as strict sentences) by defaults as in conditional knowledge bases.
For example, the formalisms in [52] interpret the purely probabilistic conditional constraint
(fly | bird)[0.95,1] as “generally, birds (and special birds) fly with a probability of at least
0.95”, while the formalisms here interpret (fly | bird)[0.95,1] as “birds fly with a probabil-
ity of at least 0.95”. Roughly, the former means that being able to fly with a probability of
at least 0.95 should apply to the class of all birds and all subclasses of birds, as long as this
does not create any inconsistencies, while the latter says that being able to fly with a prob-
ability of at least 0.95 should only apply to the class of all birds. That is, the formalisms
in [52] interpret purely probabilistic conditional constraints in a much stronger way than
the formalisms here. For this reason, they are generally much stronger than the formalisms
here. This is why the formalisms in [52] can be considered as strong nonmonotonic proba-
bilistic logics, while the formalisms here are weak nonmonotonic probabilistic logics. The
former are especially useful where logical entailment in probabilistic logic is too weak, for
example, in probabilistic logic programming [50,51] and probabilistic ontology reasoning
in the Semantic Web [30]. Other applications are deriving degrees of belief from statisti-
cal knowledge and degrees of belief, handling inconsistencies in probabilistic knowledge
bases, and probabilistic belief revision.
In particular, in reasoning from statistical knowledge and degrees of belief, the proba-
bilistic generalization of Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment in [52], which we call here
strong lex-entailment, shows a similar behavior as reference-class reasoning [41,42,60,62]
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of reference-class reasoning [52]. In particular, it can handle complex scenarios and even
purely probabilistic subjective knowledge as input. Moreover, conclusions are drawn in a
global way from all the available knowledge as a whole. The following example illustrates
the use of strong lex-entailment for reasoning from statistical knowledge and degrees of
belief.
Example 8.1. Suppose that we have the statistical knowledge “all penguins are birds”,
“between 90% and 95% of all birds fly”, “at most 5% of all penguins fly”, and “at least
95% of all yellow objects are easy to see”. Furthermore, suppose that our belief is “Sam is
a yellow penguin”. What do we then conclude about Sam’s property of being easy to see?
Under reference-class reasoning, which is a machinery for dealing with such statistical
knowledge and degrees of belief, we conclude “Sam is easy to see with a probability of at
least 0.95”. This is also exactly what we obtain using the notion of strong lex-entailment
from [52]:
The above statistical knowledge can be represented by the probabilistic knowl-
edge base KB = (L,P ) = ({bird ⇐ penguin}, {(fly | bird)[0.9,0.95], (fly | penguin)[0,
0.05], (easy_to_see | yellow)[0.95,1]}), where conditional constraints (ψ |φ)[l, u] in P
now informally read as “generally, the probability of ψ given φ is in [l, u]”. This KB is
strongly p-consistent [52], and under strong lex-entailment from KB, we obtain the tight
conclusion (easy_to_see | yellow∧penguin)[0.95,1], as desired.
Note that KB is also satisfiable and p-consistent. However, under every semantics
among logical and (weak) p-, z-, and lex-entailment from KB, we obtain the tight con-
clusion (easy_to_see | yellow ∧ penguin)[0,1], rather than the desired one.
8.2. Probabilistic reasoning under g-coherence
Another related formalism is probabilistic reasoning under g-coherence. It is an ap-
proach to reasoning with imprecise probability assessments, which has been extensively
explored especially in the field of statistics, and which is based on the coherence principle
of de Finetti and suitable generalizations of it (see, for example, the work by Biazzo and
Gilio [8], Gilio [27,28], and Gilio and Scozzafava [29]), or on similar principles that have
been adopted for lower and upper probabilities (Pelessoni and Vicig [59], Vicig [66], and
Walley [68]).
Interestingly, the notions of p-consistency and p-entailment for probabilistic knowl-
edge bases coincide with the notions of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment, respec-
tively, for imprecise probability assessments (cf. Theorems 4.10 and 4.11). We now recall
the main concepts from probabilistic reasoning under g-coherence. We start by defining
(precise) probability assessments and their coherence. We then define imprecise probabil-
ity assessments and the notions of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment for them and for
probabilistic knowledge bases.
A probability assessment (L,A) on a set of conditional events E consists of a set of
logical constraints L, and a mapping A that assigns to each ε ∈ E a real number in [0,1].
Informally, L describes logical relationships, while A represents probabilistic knowledge.
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G :IΦ → R be defined as follows. For every I ∈ IΦ :
G(I) =
n∑
i=1
si · I (φi) ·
(
I (ψi)−A(ψi |φi)
)
.
In the framework of betting criterion, G can be interpreted as the random gain corre-
sponding to a combination of n bets of amounts s1 · A(ψ1|φ1), . . . , sn · A(ψn|φn) on
ψ1|φ1, . . . ,ψn|φn with stakes s1, . . . , sn. In detail, to bet on ψi |φi , one pays an amount
of si · A(ψi |φi), and one gets back the amount of si , 0, and si · A(ψi |φi), when ψi ∧ φi ,
¬ψi ∧ φi , and ¬φi , respectively, turns out to be true. The following notion of coherence
now assures that it is impossible (for both the gambler and the bookmaker) to have sure (or
uniform) loss. A probability assessment (L,A) on a set of conditional events E is coherent
iff for every {ψ1|φ1, . . . ,ψn|φn} ⊆ E with n  1 and for all real numbers s1, . . . , sn, the
following holds:
max
I ∈IΦ,I |=L∪{φ1∨···∨φn}
n∑
i=1
si · I (φi) ·
(
I (ψi)−A(ψi |φi)
)
 0.
An imprecise probability assessment (L,A) on a set of conditional events E consists of
a set of logical constraints L and a mapping A that assigns to each ε ∈ E an interval
[l, u] ⊆ [0,1], l  u. We say (L,A) is g-coherent iff a coherent precise probability as-
sessment (L,A	) on E exists with A	(ε) ∈ A(ε) for all ε ∈ E . The imprecise probability
assessment [l, u] on a conditional event γ , denoted {(γ, [l, u])}, is called a g-coherent con-
sequence of (L,A) iff A	(γ ) ∈ [l, u] for every coherent precise probability assessment
A	 on E ∪ {γ } such that A	(ε) ∈ A(ε) for all ε ∈ E . It is a tight g-coherent consequence
of (L,A) iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of A	(γ ) subject to all coherent
precise probability assessments A	 on E∪{γ } such that A	(ε) ∈ A(ε) for all ε ∈ E . Observe
that for ε = β|α such that L |= ¬α, every {(ε, [l, u])} with l, u ∈ [0,1] is a g-coherent con-
sequence of (L,A), and {(ε, [1,0])} is the unique tight g-coherent consequence of (L,A).
We now recall the concepts of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment for probabilis-
tic knowledge bases from [10,11]. Every imprecise probability assessment IP = (L,A),
where L is finite, and A is defined on a finite set of conditional events E , can be represented
by the following probabilistic knowledge base:
KBIP =
(
L,
{
(ψ |φ)[l, u] | ψ |φ ∈ E, A(ψ |φ) = [l, u]}).
Conversely, each probabilistic knowledge base KB = (L,P ) can be expressed by the fol-
lowing imprecise probability assessment IPKB = (L,AKB) on EKB:
AKB =
{(
ψ |φ, [l, u]) | (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ KB},
EKB =
{
ψ |φ | ∃ l, u ∈ [0,1]: (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ KB}.
A probabilistic knowledge base KB is g-coherent iff IPKB is g-coherent. For g-coherent
probabilistic knowledge bases KB and conditional constraints (ψ |φ)[l, u], we say (ψ |φ)[l,
u] is a g-coherent consequence of KB, denoted KB ‖∼ g(ψ |φ)[l, u], iff {(ψ |φ, [l, u])} is a
g-coherent consequence of IPKB. We say (ψ |φ)[l, u] is a tight g-coherent consequence of
KB, denoted KB ‖∼ gtight(ψ |φ)[l, u], iff {(ψ |φ, [l, u])} is a tight g-coherent consequence of
IPKB.
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We have presented approaches to weak nonmonotonic probabilistic logics, which are
combinations of probabilistic logic with default reasoning in Kraus et al.’s System P ,
Pearl’s System Z, and Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment. The new formalisms allow
for handling in a uniform framework strict and default logical knowledge as well as purely
probabilistic knowledge (for example, such as the strict logical knowledge “all ostriches
are birds”, the default logical knowledge “generally, birds have legs” and “generally, birds
fly”, and the purely probabilistic knowledge “ostriches fly with a probability of at most
0.05”). Interestingly, probabilistic entailment in System P coincides with probabilistic
entailment under g-coherence from imprecise probability assessments. We have then ana-
lyzed the semantic and nonmonotonic properties of the new formalisms. We have shown
that they all are proper generalizations of their classical counterparts, and they have simi-
lar properties as them. In particular, they all satisfy the rationality postulates of System P
and a Conditioning property. Moreover, probabilistic entailment in System Z and proba-
bilistic lexicographic entailment both satisfy the property of Rational Monotonicity and an
Irrelevance property, while probabilistic entailment in System P does not. We have also
analyzed the relationships between the new formalisms. Here, probabilistic entailment in
System P is weaker than probabilistic entailment in System Z, which in turn is weaker
than probabilistic lexicographic entailment. Moreover, they all are weaker than entailment
in probabilistic logic where default sentences are interpreted as strict sentences. Whenever
this does not create any inconsistencies, both probabilistic entailment in System Z and
probabilistic lexicographic entailment even coincide with such entailment in probabilistic
logic, while probabilistic entailment in System P does not. Finally, we have also presented
algorithms for reasoning under probabilistic entailment in System Z and probabilistic lex-
icographic entailment, and given a precise picture of its computational complexity.
In the same spirit as a companion paper [52], this paper has shed light on exciting novel
formalisms for probabilistic reasoning with conditional constraints beyond probabilistic
logic. Differently from the formalisms in [52], however, the ones here are a “conservative”
integration of probabilistic logic with conditional knowledge bases (cf. Section 8.1). That
is, they allow for handling in a uniform framework logical and conditional constraints as
in probabilistic logic as well as defaults as in conditional knowledge bases. Hence, they
are especially useful for reasoning about degrees of belief and defaults (as in, for example,
medical or fault diagnosis). An implementation of reasoning in weak (and also strong)
nonmonotonic probabilistic logics is available as a part of the system NMPROBLOG [53].
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Recall that KB ||= (ψ |φ)[l, u] iff every model Pr of L∪ P is also
a model of (ψ |φ)[l, u]. The latter is equivalent to Pr(ψ |φ) ∈ [l, u] for every model Pr of
L ∪ P with Pr(φ) > 0, which in turn is equivalent to Prφ(ψ) ∈ [l, u] for every model Pr
of L∪P with Pr(φ) > 0. This argument also shows that KB ||=tight (ψ |φ)[l, u] iff l (resp.,
u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Prφ(ψ) subject to all models Pr of L ∪ P with
Pr(φ) > 0. 
Proof of Theorem 2.4. The two statements of the theorem follow immediately from the
observation that probabilistic interpretations Pr satisfy a logical constraint ψ ⇐ φ iff they
satisfy the conditional constraint (ψ |φ)[1,1]. 
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Recall that KB ||=ψ ⇐ φ iff every model Pr of L∪P = L is also a
model of ψ ⇐ φ. Consider now any model I ∈ IΦ of L. Let the probabilistic interpretation
Pr be defined by Pr(I ) = 1 and Pr(J ) = 0 for all other J ∈ IΦ . Then, Pr is a model of
L, and thus also satisfies ψ ⇐ φ. That is, I is a model of ψ ⇐ φ. Conversely, consider
any model Pr of L. Hence, every I ∈ IΦ with Pr(I) > 0 is a model of L, and thus also of
ψ ⇐ φ. That is, Pr is a model of ψ ⇐ φ. 
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.5. We first suppose that P = ∅. Recall that the empty mapping σ on
such P is admissible with KB iff L is satisfiable. The latter is equivalent to the existence
of a probability ranking κ that is admissible with KB, since every probability ranking κ
satisfies κ(Pr) = 0 < ∞ for at least one probabilistic interpretation Pr. In the following,
we assume that P 	= ∅.
(⇐) Assume that there exists a conditional constraint ranking σ on KB that is admissi-
ble with KB. Let the probability ranking κ on all Pr be defined as follows:
κ(Pr) =


∞ if Pr 	|= L;
0 if Pr |= L∪ P ;
1 + maxC∈P : Pr 	|=C σ(C) otherwise.
We now show that κ is indeed a probability ranking and that κ is also admissible with KB.
Let C ∈ P such that σ(C) is minimal. Since σ is admissible with KB, it follows that C
is tolerated by P under L. Hence, in particular, there exists a model Pr of L ∪ P . Thus,
κ(Pr) = 0. We next show that κ(¬F) = ∞ for all F ∈ L. Observe that κ(Pr) = ∞ for
all Pr such that Pr 	|=F (that is, Pr |= ¬F ) for some F ∈ L. Thus, κ(¬F) = ∞ for all
F ∈ L. We finally show that κ(φ > 0) < ∞ and κ(φ > 0 ∧ C) < κ(φ > 0 ∧ ¬C) for all
C = (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ P . Since {C′ ∈ P | σ(C′)  σ(C)} tolerates C under L, it holds that
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it holds that σ(C) < κ(φ > 0 ∧ ¬C). In summary, κ(φ > 0) < ∞ and κ(φ > 0 ∧ C) <
κ(φ > 0 ∧¬C) for every C = (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ P . This shows that κ is admissible with KB.
(⇒) Let κ be a probability ranking admissible with KB. We define the conditional
constraint ranking σ on KB by σ(C) = κ(φ > 0 ∧C) for all C = (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ P . We now
show that σ is admissible with KB. Suppose P ′ ⊆ P is in conflict with C = (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ P
under L. Towards a contradiction, let σ(C′) σ(C) for all C′ ∈ P ′. Let Pr be a model of
L such that σ(C) = κ(Pr) and Pr |= φ > 0 ∧ C. Assume now Pr 	|=C′ for some C′ =
(β|α)[r, s] ∈ L′. Then, κ(α > 0) < ∞ and κ(α > 0 ∧ ¬C′)  σ(C)  σ(C′) = κ(α >
0 ∧ C′). But this contradicts κ being admissible with KB. Thus, Pr is a model of P ′.
But this contradicts P ′ being in conflict with C under L. Hence, σ(C′) < σ(C) for some
C′ ∈ P ′. Thus, σ is admissible with KB. 
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Immediate by Theorem 4.5 and the fact that the existence of an
admissible conditional constraint ranking on KB is equivalent to the existence of an ordered
partition (P0, . . . ,Pk) of P such that either (a) or (b) holds. 
Proof of Theorem 4.8. (⇒) Suppose that (L,P ∪{(ψ |φ)[p,p]}) is p-consistent for some
p ∈ [0, l) ∪ (u,1]. By Theorem 4.5, there exists a probability ranking that is admissible
with KB such that κ(φ > 0) < ∞ and κ(φ > 0∧(ψ |φ)[p,p]) < κ(φ > 0∧¬(ψ |φ)[p,p]).
Since κ(φ > 0∧¬(ψ |φ)[l, u]) κ(φ > 0∧ (ψ |φ)[p,p]) and κ(φ > 0∧¬(ψ |φ)[p,p])
κ(φ > 0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[l, u]), it follows κ(φ > 0) < ∞ and κ(φ > 0 ∧ ¬(ψ |φ)[l, u])  κ(φ >
0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[l, u]). That is, KB ‖∼ p(ψ |φ)[l, u] does not hold.
(⇐) Suppose that KB ‖∼ p(ψ |φ)[l, u] does not hold. That is, κ(φ > 0) < ∞ and κ(φ >
0∧(ψ |φ)[l, u]) κ(φ > 0∧¬(ψ |φ)[l, u]) for some probability ranking κ admissible with
KB. Let Pr be a model of L such that Pr |= φ > 0 ∧ ¬(ψ |φ)[l, u] and κ(Pr) = κ(φ > 0 ∧
¬(ψ |φ)[l, u]). We define p ∈ [0, l)∪ (u,1] by p = Pr(ψ |φ). It then follows that κ(φ > 0∧
¬(ψ |φ)[l, u]) = κ(φ > 0∧(ψ |φ)[p,p]). Moreover, it holds that κ(φ > 0∧(ψ |φ)[q, q])
κ(φ > 0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[p,p]) for all q ∈ [0, l) ∪ (u,1]. In summary, it thus follows that (	)
κ(φ > 0) < ∞ and κ(φ > 0 ∧ ¬(ψ |φ)[p,p])  κ(φ > 0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[p,p]). We now show
that KB′ = (L,P ∪ {(ψ |φ)[p,p]}) is p-consistent. We define the conditional constraint
ranking σ on KB by (i) σ(C) = κ(α > 0 ∧C) for all C = (β|α)[r, s] ∈ P such that κ(α >
0 ∧ C) < κ(φ > 0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[p,p]), (ii) σ((ψ |φ)[p,p]) = κ(φ > 0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[p,p]), and
(iii) σ(C) = κ(α > 0 ∧ C) + 1 for all C = (β|α)[r, s] ∈ P with κ(α > 0 ∧ C)  κ(φ >
0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[p,p]). We now show that σ is admissible with KB′. It is sufficient to show
that every C ∈ P is tolerated by PC = {C′ ∈ P ∪ {(ψ |φ)[p,p]} | σ(C′) σ(C)} under L.
By the proof of Theorem 4.5, it follows that σ restricted to P is admissible with KB.
Thus, it is sufficient to show that every C = (β|α)[r, s] ∈ P is tolerated by PC = {C′ ∈
P ∪ {(ψ |φ)[p,p]} | σ(C′)  σ(C)} under L, where either (a) κ(α > 0 ∧ C) < κ(φ >
0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[p,p]), or (b) C = (ψ |φ)[p,p]. Towards a contradiction, assume first that some
C = (β|α)[r, s] ∈ P with (a) is not tolerated by PC under L. Let Pr be a model of L such
that Pr |= α > 0 ∧ C and κ(Pr) = κ(α > 0 ∧ C). Let C′ = (β ′|α′)[r ′, s′] ∈ PC such that
Pr 	|= C′ and (a.i) κ(α′ > 0∧C′) < κ(φ > 0∧ (ψ |φ)[p, p]), or (a.ii) C′ = (ψ |φ)[p,p], or
(a.iii) κ(α′ > 0 ∧C′) κ(φ > 0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[p,p]). It then holds κ(α′ > 0) < ∞ and κ(α′ >
0 ∧¬C′) κ(Pr) = σ(C). Furthermore, it holds (a.i) σ(C) σ(C′) = κ(α′ > 0 ∧C′), or
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But in (a.ii) this contradicts (	) and in (a.i) and (a.iii) this contradicts κ being admissible
with KB. Hence, Pr is a model of PC . But this contradicts C not being tolerated by PC
under L. Assume next that (b) C = (ψ |φ)[p,p] is not tolerated by PC under L. Let Pr be a
model of L such that Pr |= φ > 0∧C and κ(Pr) = κ(φ > 0∧C). Let C′ = (β|α)[r, s] ∈ PC
such that Pr 	|= C′. Observe that κ(α > 0 ∧ C′)  κ(φ > 0 ∧ (ψ |φ)[p,p]). Thus, κ(α >
0) < ∞ and κ(α > 0 ∧ ¬C′)  κ(Pr) = σ(C) < σ(C′) = κ(α > 0 ∧ C′) + 1. But this
contradicts κ being admissible with KB. Hence, Pr is a model of PC . But this contradicts C
not being tolerated by PC under L. In summary, σ is admissible with KB′. That is, KB′ is
p-consistent, where p ∈ [0, l)∪ (u,1]. 
Proof of Theorem 4.9. Immediate by Theorem 4.8. 
Proof of Lemma 4.14. Towards a contradiction, assume that z is not admissible with KB.
That is, some P ′ ⊆ P is under L in conflict with some C ∈ P , and P ′ contains no C′ with
z(C′) < z(C). Thus, P ′ ⊆ PC = {C′ ∈ P | z(C′) z(C)}. Since PC tolerates C under L,
also P ′ tolerates C under L. But this contradicts P ′ being under L in conflict with C.
Hence, (a) z is admissible with KB, and by the “⇐”-part of the proof of Theorem 4.5, also
(b) κz is admissible with KB. 
Proof of Theorem 4.16. Suppose first that L 	|=⊥ ⇐ φ. Then, κz(φ > 0) < ∞, and
κz(φ > 0 ∧ C) < κz(φ > 0 ∧ ¬C) iff all z-minimal models Pr of L with Pr(φ) > 0 sat-
isfy C. Assume next that L |=⊥ ⇐ φ. Then, κz(φ > 0) = ∞, and all z-minimal models Pr
of L with Pr(φ) > 0 satisfy C. 
Appendix C. Proofs for Section 5
While the proofs of the results in Section 4 are often similar to the proofs of their
classical counterparts in default reasoning, the proofs for Section 5 require some genuinely
probabilistic reasoning. In particular, in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we use the following no-
tations and preliminary results. For probabilistic knowledge bases KB = (L,P ) and events
α such that L 	|=¬α, we denote by Pα(KB) the set of all subsets Pn = {(ψi |φi)[li , ui] | i ∈
{1, . . . , n}} of P such that every model Pr of L ∪ Pn with Pr(φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φn ∨ α) > 0 sat-
isfies Pr(α) > 0. For KB = (L,P ) and α such that L |= ¬α, we define Pα(KB) = {∅}. For
events α and p-consistent probabilistic knowledge bases KB = (L,P ), we denote by KBα
the probabilistic knowledge base (L,P 	), where P 	 is the greatest element in Pα(KB).
Then, the following result says that probabilistic p-entailment of (β|α)[l, u] from KB can
be reduced to logical entailment of (β|α)[l, u] from KBα . It follows immediately from
a similar result for g-coherent entailment in [11] and the equivalence of probabilistic p-
entailment and g-coherent entailment, by Theorem 4.11.
Theorem C.1. Let KB = (L,P ) be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, let
(β|α)[l, u] be a conditional constraint, and let KBα be defined as above. Then,
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(b) KB ‖∼ ptight(β|α)[l, u] iff KBα ||=tight (β|α)[l, u] .
Proof of Theorem 5.1. It is easy to verify the result for ||=. In the following, we prove the
result for ‖∼ p , ‖∼ z, and ‖∼ lex.
RW. Assume first KB ‖∼ s(φ|ε)[l, u], where s ∈ {z, lex}. That is, Pr |= (φ|ε)[l, u] for all
s-minimal models Pr of L ∪ {ε > 0}. Since (φ|)[l, u] ⇒ (ψ |)[l′, u′] is logically valid,
Pr |= (ψ |ε)[l′, u′] for all s-minimal models Pr of L∪{ε > 0}. That is, KB‖∼ s(ψ |ε)[l′, u′].
Assume next KB ‖∼ p(φ|ε)[l, u]. That is, by Theorem C.1, KBε ||= (φ|ε)[l, u]. Thus,
KBε ||= (ψ |ε)[l′, u′]. That is, KB |=g (ψ |ε)[l′, u′].
Ref. Every probabilistic interpretation Pr satisfies (ε|ε)[1,1]. This shows that KB ‖∼ s
(ε|ε)[1,1] for all s ∈ {p,z, lex}.
LLE. Assume first KB‖∼ s (φ|ε)[l, u], where s ∈ {z, lex}. That is, Pr |= (φ|ε)[l, u] for
all s-minimal models Pr of L ∪ {ε > 0}. Since ε ⇔ ε′ is logically valid, Pr |= (φ|ε′)[l, u]
for all s-minimal models Pr of L ∪ {ε′ > 0}. That is, KB ‖∼ s(φ|ε′)[l, u]. Suppose next
KB‖∼ p(φ|ε)[l, u]. That is, by Theorem C.1, KBε ||= (φ|ε)[l, u]. Since ε ⇔ ε′ is logically
valid, KBε′ ||= (φ|ε′)[l, u]. That is, KB |=g (φ|ε′)[l, u].
Cut. Assume first KB‖∼ s(ε|ε′)[1,1] and KB ‖∼ s(φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u], where s ∈ {z, lex}.
That is, Pr |= (ε|ε′)[1,1] and Pr |= (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u] for all s-minimal models Pr of L ∪
{ε′ > 0} and L ∪ {ε ∧ ε′ > 0}, respectively. It thus follows Pr |= (φ|ε′)[l, u] for all s-
minimal models Pr of L ∪ {ε′ > 0}. That is, KB ‖∼ s(φ|ε′)[l, u]. Suppose next KB |=g
(ε|ε′)[1,1] and KB‖∼ p(φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u]. That is, by Theorem C.1, KBε′ ||= (ε|ε′)[1,1] and
KBε∧ε′ ||= (φ|ε∧ε′)[l, u]. By Theorem C.1, it is then easy to see that KBε′ = KBε∧ε′ . Thus,
KBε′ ||= (φ|ε′)[l, u]. That is, KB ‖∼ p(φ|ε′)[l, u].
CM. Assume first KB ‖∼ s(ε|ε′)[1,1] and KB‖∼ s(φ|ε′)[l, u], where s ∈ {z, lex}. That
is, Pr |= (ε|ε′)[1,1] and Pr |= (φ|ε′)[l, u] for all s-minimal models Pr of L ∪ {ε′ > 0}. It
follows that Pr |= (φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u] for all s-minimal models Pr of L ∪ {ε ∧ ε′ > 0}. That
is, KB‖∼ s(φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u]. Suppose next KB‖∼ p(ε|ε′)[1,1] and KB ‖∼ p(φ|ε′)[l, u]. That
is, by Theorem C.1, KBε′ ||= (ε|ε′)[1,1] and KBε′ ||= (φ|ε′)[l, u]. Thus, KBε′ ||= (φ|ε ∧
ε′)[l, u]. By Theorem C.1, it is easy to see that KBε′ = KBε∧ε′ . Thus, KBε∧ε′ ||= (φ|ε ∧
ε′)[l, u]. That is, KB ‖∼ p(φ|ε ∧ ε′)[l, u].
Or. Assume first KB ‖∼ s(φ|ε)[1,1] and KB ‖∼ s(φ|ε′)[1,1], where s ∈ {z, lex}. That
is, Pr |= (φ|ε)[1,1] and Pr |= (φ|ε′)[1,1] for all s-minimal models Pr of L ∪ {ε > 0} and
L∪{ε′ > 0}, respectively. It then follows Pr |= (φ|ε∨ε′)[1,1] for all s-minimal models Pr
of L ∪ {ε ∨ ε′ > 0}. That is, KB ‖∼ s(φ|ε ∨ ε′)[1,1]. Suppose next KB ‖∼ p(φ|ε)[1,1] and
KB‖∼ p(φ|ε′)[1,1]. That is, by Theorem C.1, KBε = (L,Pε) ||= (φ|ε)[1,1] and KBε′ =
(L,Pε′) ||= (φ|ε′)[1,1]. By Theorem C.1, it is then easy to see that Pε∨ε′ ⊇ Pε and Pε∨ε′ ⊇
Pε′ . Hence, KBε∨ε′ ||= (φ|ε)[1,1] and KBε∨ε′ ||= (φ|ε′)[1,1], where KBε∨ε′ = (L,Pε∨ε′).
It thus follows KBε∨ε′ ||= (φ|ε ∨ ε′)[1,1]. That is, KB ‖∼ p (φ|ε ∨ ε′)[1,1]. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Assume first KB ||= (ψ |ε)[1,1] and KB 	||=¬(ε′|ε)[1,1]. In partic-
ular, Pr |= (ψ |ε)[1,1] for all models Pr of L∪ P ∪ {ε > 0}. Hence, Pr |= (ψ |ε ∧ ε′)[1,1]
for all models Pr of L ∪ P ∪ {ε ∧ ε′ > 0}. That is, KB ||= (ψ |ε ∧ ε′)[1,1]. Assume next
KB‖∼ s(ψ |ε)[1,1] and KB 	‖∼s(¬ε′|ε)[1,1], s ∈ {z, lex}. That is, Pr |= (ψ |ε)[1,1] for all
s-minimal models Pr of L∪{ε > 0}, and Pr |= ¬(ε′|ε)[0,0] for some s-minimal models Pr
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That is, KB‖∼ s(ψ |ε∧ε′)[1,1]. 
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Assume that (	) no atom of KB and (ψ |ε)[1,1] occurs in ε′.
Suppose first KB ||= (ψ |ε)[1,1]. That is, Pr |= (ψ |ε)[1,1] for all models Pr of L ∪ P ∪
{ε > 0}. Hence, Pr |= (ψ |ε ∧ ε′)[1,1] for all models Pr of L ∪ P ∪ {ε ∧ ε′ > 0}. That
is, KB ||= (ψ |ε ∧ ε′)[1,1]. Assume next KB‖∼ s(ψ |ε)[1,1], where s ∈ {z, lex}. That is,
Pr |= (ψ |ε)[1,1] for all s-minimal models Pr of L∪ {ε > 0}. By (	), it follows that Pr |=
(ψ |ε ∧ ε′)[1,1] for all s-minimal models Pr of L ∪ {ε ∧ ε′ > 0}. That is, KB ‖∼ s(ψ |ε ∧
ε′)[1,1]. 
Proof of Theorem 5.6. Assume that (ψ |φ)[l, u] ∈ P and ε ⇔ φ is logically valid.
Clearly, KB ||= (ψ |ε)[l, u]. Since KB is p-consistent, the conditional constraint rank-
ing z exists, and (ψ |φ)[l, u] is tolerated by {C ∈ P | z(C)  z((ψ |φ)[l, u])} under L.
Hence, every s-minimal model Pr of L ∪ {ε > 0} satisfies (ψ |ε)[l, u], where s ∈ {z,
lex}. Hence, KB ‖∼ s(ψ |ε)[l, u]. Since (L,P ∪ {(ψ |ε)[p,p]}) is not p-consistent for all
p ∈ [0, l)∪ (u,1], it also follows KB ‖∼ p(ψ |ε)[l, u]. 
Proof of Theorem 5.7. (a) Suppose KB ‖∼ pC. By Theorem 4.8, κ(φ > 0) = ∞ or
κ(φ > 0 ∧ C) < κ(φ > 0 ∧ ¬C) for every probability ranking κ admissible with KB.
By Lemma 4.14, κz is admissible with KB. Hence, κz(φ > 0) = ∞ or κz(φ > 0 ∧ C) <
κz(φ > 0 ∧¬C). By Theorem 4.16, it thus holds KB ‖∼ zC.
(b) Suppose KB ‖∼ zC. That is, every z-minimal model Pr of L ∪ {φ > 0} satisfies C.
Since every lex-minimal model Pr of L∪{φ > 0} is also a z-minimal model of L∪{φ > 0},
it follows that every lex-minimal model Pr of L∪ {φ > 0} satisfies C. That is, KB ‖∼ lexC.
(c) Suppose KB ‖∼ lexC. That is, every lex-minimal model Pr of L ∪ {φ > 0} satisfies
C. Assume first Pr(φ) = 0 for every model Pr of L ∪ P . Then, KB ||= C trivially holds.
Assume next L∪P ∪{φ > 0} is satisfiable. Thus, Pr is a lex-minimal model of L∪{φ > 0}
iff it is a model of L ∪ P ∪ {φ > 0}. Hence, every model of L ∪ P ∪ {φ > 0} satisfies C.
That is, KB ||=C. 
Proof of Theorem 5.8. The existence of some model Pr of L∪P ∪{φ > 0} implies that a
probabilistic interpretation Pr is a model of L ∪ P ∪ {φ > 0} iff it is a lex-minimal model
of L∪ {φ > 0} iff it is a z-minimal model of L∪ {φ > 0}. 
Proof of Theorem 5.10. (a) A conditional constraint ranking σ on KB is admissible with
KB iff the default ranking σ ◦ γ−1 on γ (KB) is admissible with γ (KB).
(b), (c) Observe that (P0, . . . ,Pk) is the z-partition of KB iff (γ (P0), . . . , γ (Pk)) is the
classical z-partition of γ (KB). Furthermore, every s-minimal model Pr of L ∪ {α > 0}
satisfies (β|α)[1,1] iff every classical s-minimal model I of L∪ {α} satisfies β , where s ∈
{z, lex}. 
Appendix D. Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Theorem 6.1. (a) If L∪ {α>0} is unsatisfiable, then KB ‖∼ s (β|α)[1,0].tight
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model of L∪ {α > 0} iff Pr is a model of L∪H ∪ {α > 0} for some H ∈Dsα(KB):
(⇒) Let Pr be an s-minimal model of L∪{α > 0}. Let H ′ = {C ∈ P | Pr |= C}. Clearly,
Pr |= L ∪ H ′ ∪ {α > 0}. We now show that H ′ ∈ Dsα(KB). Suppose not. That is, some
H ′′ ⊆ P exists such that L∪H ′′ ∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable and that H ′′ is s-preferable to H ′.
Thus, a model Pr′ of L∪H ′′ ∪ {α > 0} exists. As H ′′ is s-preferable to H ′, the model Pr′
of L ∪ {α > 0} is s-preferable to Pr. But this contradicts Pr being an s-minimal model of
L∪ {α > 0}. Thus, H ′ ∈Dsα(KB).
(⇐) Let Pr be a model of L ∪ H ′ ∪ {α > 0} for some H ′ ∈ Dsα(KB). Clearly, Pr is
a model of L ∪ {α > 0}. We now show that Pr is an s-minimal model of L ∪ {α > 0}.
Suppose not. That is, there exists a model Pr′ of L∪{α > 0} that is s-preferable to Pr. Thus,
{C ∈ P | Pr′ |= C} ⊆ P is s-preferable to H ′. But this contradicts H ′ being a member of
Dsα(KB). Hence, Pr is an s-minimal model of L∪ {α > 0}. 
Appendix E. Proofs for Section 7
The proofs of Theorems 7.1–7.4 are similar to the proofs of related complexity results in
[52]. We first give some preparatory definitions as follows. In the sequel, let KB = (L,P )
be a p-consistent probabilistic knowledge base, and let (β|α)[l, u] be a conditional con-
straint. Let n denote the cardinality of P . For the following definitions, let L ∪ {α > 0}
be satisfiable. An ordered partition (P0, . . . ,Pk) of P is admissible with KB iff for each
i ∈ {0, . . . , k} and each (ψ |φ)[r, s] ∈ Pi , the set L ∪ {φ > 0} ∪⋃{Pj | j  i} is satisfi-
able. The weight of an ordered partition (P0, . . . ,Pk) of P is defined as
∑k
i=0 i · |Pi |. Let
wmin denote the least weight w of all ordered partitions of P that are admissible with
KB. As in classical default reasoning, the z-partition of KB is the unique ordered parti-
tion (P 	0 , . . . ,P
	
k ) of P that is admissible with KB and that has the weight wmin. Let jmin
denote the least j ∈ {0, . . . , k+1} such that L ∪⋃{P 	i | i  j} ∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable.
Let nmin = (|P ′ ∩P 	0 |, . . . , |P ′ ∩P 	k |) for some P ′ ∈Dlexα (KB).
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Let KB = (L,P ). We first prove membership in PNP‖ . By Theo-
rem 6.1, it holds that KB ‖∼ z(β|α)[l, u] iff either (i) or (ii) holds:
(i) L∪ {α > 0} is unsatisfiable.
(ii) L∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable, and L∪⋃{P 	i | i  jmin} ||= (β|α)[l, u].
Deciding whether L ∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable can be done with one NP-oracle call. If
L ∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable, then we compute the least weight wmin ∈ {0, . . . , n(n−1)/2}
and the value jmin ∈ {0, . . . , n + 1}, which can both be done in deterministic polynomial
time with O(logn) calls to an NP-oracle. Finally, we decide whether L ∪⋃{P 	i | i 
jmin} ||= (ψ |φ)[l, u], which can be done with one NP-oracle call. Since four rounds of par-
allel NP oracle queries can be replaced by a single round of NP queries, this means that the
problem is in PNP.‖
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problem [18]. Given a p-consistent conditional knowledge base KB′ = (L′,D′) and a de-
fault δ ← γ , decide whether KB′ |∼ zδ ← γ .
We define KB = (L′, {(ψ |φ)[1,1] | ψ ← φ ∈ D′}) and β|α = δ|γ . By Theorem 5.10,
KB′ |∼ zδ ← γ iff KB‖∼ z(β|α)[1,1]. 
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Let KB = (L,P ). We first prove PNP-membership. By Theo-
rem 6.1, it holds that KB ‖∼ lex(β|α)[l, u] iff either (i) or (ii) holds:
(i) L∪ {α > 0} is unsatisfiable.
(ii) L∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable, and L∪ P ′ |= (β|α)[l, u] for all P ′ ∈Dlexα (KB).
Deciding whether L ∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable can be done with one NP-oracle call. If
L ∪ {α > 0} is satisfiable, then we compute the least weight wmin ∈ {0, . . . , n(n−1)/2},
which can be done in deterministic polynomial time with O(logn) calls to an NP-oracle.
Moreover, we compute the vector nmin ∈ {0, . . . , n}k . This can be done with k rounds of
binary search, where each round runs in deterministic polynomial time with O(logn) calls
to an NP-oracle. Finally, we decide whether L ∪ P ′ |= (β|α)[l, u] for all P ′ ∈ Dlexα (KB),
which can be done with one call to an NP-oracle. In summary, the problem is in PNP.
Hardness for PNP is proved by a polynomial reduction from the following PNP-complete
problem [18]. Given a p-consistent conditional knowledge base KB′ = (L′,D′), where L′
is a finite set of literal-Horn logical constraints and D′ is a finite set of literal-Horn defaults
(which are of the form ψ ← φ, where ψ is either a basic event or the negation of a basic
event, and φ is either  or a conjunction of basic events), and δ ← γ is a literal-Horn
default, decide whether KB′ |∼ lexδ ← γ .
We now construct KB = (L,P ) and C = (β|α)[l, u] as stated in the theorem such that
KB′ |∼ lex δ ← γ iff KB ‖∼ lexC. We define KB and C by L = L′ and
P = {(p|φ)[1,1] | p ← φ ∈ D′, p ∈ Φ}∪ {(p|φ)[0,0] | ¬p ← φ ∈ D′, p ∈ Φ},
C =
{
(p|γ )[1,1] if δ = p and p ∈ Φ,
(p|γ )[0,0] if δ = ¬p and p ∈ Φ.
Notice that KB and C are literal-Horn. By a slight generalization of Theorem 5.10,
KB′ |∼ lexδ ← γ iff KB‖∼ lexC. 
Proof of Theorems 7.3 and 7.4. Let KB = (L,P ). We first prove membership in FPNP.
Let s ∈ {z, lex}. The interval [l, u] ⊆ [0,1] such that KB ‖∼ s(β|α)[l, u] can be computed
by a variant of Algorithm tight-entailment-opt in [51], which can be done in FPNP. Rather
than checking the existence of some model Pr of L ∪ P with Pr(α) > 0, we check the
existence of some P ′ ∈Dsα(KB) and some model Pr of L ∪ P ′ with Pr(α) > 0. Once the
z-partition of KB, the value jmin, and the vector nmin are computed (which can be done in
FPNP by the proofs of Theorems 7.1 and 7.2) guessing and verifying P ′ ∈ Dsα(KB) is in
NP, and thus does not increase the complexity. Hence, the new algorithm can be done in
FPNP.
Hardness for FPNP is shown by a polynomial reduction from the FPNP-complete travel-
ing salesman cost problem [56]. Given a set of n 1 cities V = {1,2, . . . , n} and a nonneg-
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smallest length d of a tour through all the cities, that is, the minimum of
∑n
i=1 dπ(i),π(σ (i))
subject to all permutations π , where σ(n) = 1, and σ(i) = i + 1 for all i < n. Without loss
of generality, we can assume n 3.
Let s be the sum of all di,j with i, j ∈ V and i < j . We now construct KB = (L,P )
and β|α as stated in the theorem such that the smallest length d of a tour is s · l, where l is
given by KB ‖∼ ztight(β|α)[l,1] (and also KB‖∼ lextight(β|α)[l,1]).
Let E = {{i, j}⊆V | i 	= j} and w{i,j} = di,j /s for all {i, j} ∈ E. The set of basic events
Φ is defined as Φ1 ∪Φ2, where Φ1={pi,j | i, j ∈ V } and Φ2={p} ∪ {pe | e ∈ E}. We then
define a set of literal-Horn conditional constraints P1 = P1,1 ∪ P1,2 ∪ P1,3 that describes
the set of all permutations of the members in V as follows:
P1,1 =
{
(pi,j | pi,k)[0,0] | i, j, k ∈ V, j < k
}
,
P1,2 =
{
(pi,j | pk,j )[0,0] | i, j, k ∈ V, i < k
}
,
P1,3 =
{
(pi,j | )[1/n,1/n] | i, j ∈ V
}
.
Roughly speaking, each world I with Pr1(I ) > 0 for some model Pr1 of P1 corresponds
to a permutation of the members in V , and vice versa. We next define a set of literal-Horn
conditional constraints P2 = P2,1 ∪P2,2 ∪P2,3 that associates each such permutation with
its tour length, and the predicate symbol p with the sum of all such tour lengths as follows:
P2,1 =
{
(pe1 | pe2)[0,0] | e1, e2 ∈ E, e1 	= e2
}
,
P2,2 =
{
(p{i,j} | pu,i ∧ pσ(u),j )[w{i,j},w{i,j}] | u ∈ V, {i, j} ∈ E
}
,
P2,3 =
{
(p | pe)[1,1] | e ∈ E
}
.
We finally define KB = (L,P ) = (∅,P1 ∪ P2). Observe that KB and p| are literal-Horn
and that L is empty. As proved in [9], KB is p-consistent. This shows in particular that
L ∪ P has a model Pr with Pr() > 0. Hence, by Theorem 5.8, KB ||=tight (p|)[l,1]
iff KB ‖∼ ztight (p|)[l,1] (iff KB ‖∼ lextight (p|)[l,1]). As shown in [51], KB ||=tight
(p|)[l,1] iff s · l is the smallest length of a tour through all the cities. In summary,
KB‖∼ ztight(p|)[l,1] (iff KB ‖∼ lextight(p|)[l,1]) iff s · l is the smallest length of a tour
through all the cities. 
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